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Abstract
This research examined technology training (using 
computers as a specific instance of technology) in a 
framework that integrated concepts drawn from cognitive 
and social learning theory. Borrowing from cognitive 
learning theory, two types of knowledge were assessed: 
declarative knowledge (knowing what) and procedural 
knowledge (knowing how). Behavior modeling training, 
drawn from social learning theory, was used as the primary 
training methodology. It was proposed that the factors 
contributing to learning as a function of behavior 
modeling are the same factors that lead to procedural 
knowledge acquisition. I also examined the effects of two 
major attitudes toward computers in predicting computer 
knowledge and the role of training methodology in altering 
attitudes. Using 255 undergraduate subjects divided into 
four training conditions, the study explored the effects 
of modeling training and lecture training (in a crossed 
design) on declarative and procedural knowledge (measured 
using both a paper and pencil test and a performance 
test). Knowledge and computer attitude assessment 
occurred before and after training.
I found declarative and procedural knowledge to be 
highly related to performance with the latter being 
significantly more so than the former. Analysis of the 
training methods indicated that modeling was an effective
means of instructing individuals on computer use. Lecture 
training was not superior to practice alone in increasing 
trainee knowledge, but was effective in improving 
performance. Pertaining to attitudes, beliefs in the 
computer as a beneficial tool were increased in training 
conditions that received a lecture whereas beliefs in the 
computer as an autonomous entity were decreased in 
conditions that did not receive a lecture. Pre-test 
autonomous entity beliefs significantly predicted computer 
knowledge acquisition. This research suggests that 
modeling training does not require a lecture component to 
be effective as a means of training individuals on 
computers. Future research should replicate these 
findings and further explore the proposed relationship 
between cognitive and social learning theory in other 
domains aside from computers. The study also suggests 
implications for research on how computer attitudes affect 
learning, and on how training programs can alter trainee 
attitudes toward the machines.
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Introduction
A consideration of the major factors influencing the 
workforce of the 20th century would fall far short of 
being complete if it failed to include the impact of 
computer technology. The advent of computer-related 
technologies in our society represents nothing less than a 
revolution in the means by which tasks are carried out in 
the workplace. This revolution is particularly noteworthy 
when one considers it in the context of other innovations. 
For example, Gantz (1986) notes that the personal computer 
has, in a few years, acquired the equivalent societal 
penetration of the telephone in its seventy-five years of 
use. Further examples of this phenomenon are abundant in 
everyday life. Virtually all aspects of white-collar, and 
a growing number of blue-collar, workplaces absolutely 
require some form of computer technology to remain 
effective. Two maxims seem appropriate in this context: 
first, that computer-related technology has significantly 
altered the landscape of the workplace (e.g., computers 
replacing typewriters, databases replacing filing 
cabinets), and second, that this alteration has been swift 
and unrelenting.
Considering these two factors, it is not surprising 
to note a concomitant increase in the needs of those 
individuals who use the new technologies. Naisbitt (1982) 
perceptively noted this widening gap between technology
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and the human element through his introduction of the term 
"high touch." Naisbitt argues that increases in "high 
tech" must be matched with increases in accessibility to 
the human element (i.e., "high touch"). This contrast 
seems to polarize the demands of technology with the needs 
of the worker; a view which has a parallel in the growing 
computer technology literature.
Technology researchers tend to possess either a 
positive or negative outlook on computer-related 
technology prior to conducting their research (Long, 1987; 
Turnage, 1990). Idealists take a positive outlook on the 
impact of technology on society and see it as an 
opportunity for workers (e.g., Martocchio, 1992), or as a 
beneficial tool for humans (e.g., Lee, 1970). In 
contrast, nay-sayers, who view computers in a negative 
light, tend to characterize the technology in terms of 
deskilling (i.e., decreasing the skills required to do a 
job thereby decreasing the need for highly skilled labor), 
or in terms of the physical and physiological problems 
associated with the implementation of office automation 
(e.g., Smith, Cohen, & Stammerjohn, 1981).
Recently, Turnage (1990) has reiterated this 
dichotomy (i.e., idealists versus nay-sayers) in her 
review of the impact of computer-based technology on the 
field of psychology. Rather than contrasting these views, 
Turnage argues for merging the polarized perspectives in
order to increase the productivity of the American 
workforce. She points to the importance of matching the 
needs of the American worker with the explosive demands 
for new skills related to computer technology. In 
essence, it is essential that the field of 
Industrial/Organizational Psychology begin to look at the 
means by which we train our workers for the technology 
dominated workplaces of the future.
One major purpose of the present research directs 
itself at the comments of Turnage (1990) as well as other 
reviewers of work-related technological research (e.g., 
Parsons, 1988). We are hearing the increasingly common 
cry that the impact of psychology on technology falls far 
short of keeping pace with the expansive penetration of 
technology in the workplace. Thus the first purpose of 
this research directs itself at narrowing the gap between 
psychological research on technology and the effects of 
that technology in the workplace. There are two avenues 
for further investigation in the research literature: 
attitudes toward computer-based technology and technology 
training. To examine the interplay between attitudes and 
training, I will endeavor to bring together the research 
which: 1) examines relations between attitudes and 
computer use, and 2) suggests that attitudes have some 
relation to training outcomes.
In initiating my analysis of attitude and ability 
research on technology, I chose to narrow the examination 
to computer based technology specifically. It can be 
argued that computers themselves are the most pervasive 
and representative form of technology in the workplace. 
Further, other forms of new technology (e.g., fax 
machines, automated tellers, robotics) lack the empirical 
base from which a sound theoretical examination may begin.
In order to examine the effects of computer training 
on trainee attitudes toward and ability with computers, I 
conducted a review of the psychological literature 
relevant to computers. One general observation from this 
review brings out a major distinction in our literature: 
research on computer training is not synonymous with 
training that uses computers. That is, we have a 
proclivity toward using computers to train individuals 
without fully regarding the impact of the computer itself 
on the training results. More research is needed which 
directly examines the computer's impact on the user.
Another observation I gained from the extant 
literature that specifically addresses computer training 
concerns the co-existence of two apparently independent 
theories of learning. At the macro-focal level, 
researchers tend to use social learning theory as a 
theoretical base (e.g., Goldstein, 1993). In examining 
more micro-level issues in learning, researchers adopt the
cognitive learning framework (e.g., Glaser & Bassock,
1989). The second major purpose of the present study is 
to integrate concepts borrowed from the two theories 
within the context of computer training.
Cognitive learning theory is discussed first to 
provide a theoretical framework for the knowledge-based 
aspects of computer training. Once the general cognitive 
learning principles have been put forth, a discussion of 
social learning theory and its methodological counterpart, 
behavioral modeling training, is presented. In serving 
the second purpose of this effort, concepts from the two 
theories are subsequently linked together to form an 
integrated theoretical framework for the present study. 
Within this context, research on computer attitudes is 
brought in to complete the design of the study. Thus my 
approach is two-pronged: first, to examine how readily the 
components of the two learning theories may be combined, 
and second, to provide a testable theoretical basis for 
training in computer technology and the role of computer 
attitudes in training success.
Cognitive Learning Theory
At its most basic level, training is the process of 
facilitating the acquisition of a skill or learned 
behavior (Hinrichs, 1976). In the context of 
organizations, McGehee and Thayer (1961) define training 
as formal organizational procedures used to facilitate 
learning that contributes to the goals of the 
organization. These definitions point to the centrality 
of learning in the context of training. Consequently, a 
discussion of the learning process in general can serve to 
form a theoretical basis for the present research and a 
framework for the discussion of further topics.
Learning has been defined as a "relatively permanent 
change in knowledge or skill produced by experience." 
(Weiss, 1990, p. 172). From this definition, Weiss (1990) 
points out several aspects of learning theory that are 
particularly instructive. First, we can distinguish 
learning from performance on the basis of behavior. 
Performance is the execution of learned behavior, 
therefore, it is possible to include the concept of 
learning without performance (a lack of transfer of 
training would explain a phenomenon such as this).
A second aspect of Weiss' (1990) definition concerns 
the issue of experience. Experience separates the 
learning construct from other influences on behavior such 
as traits, dispositions, and maturational factors. Under
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this definition, learning through experience is assumed to 
be ubiquitously accessible across individuals regardless 
of their particular characteristics. A further point 
concerning learning and experience is that the knowledge 
acquired results from changes that possess a certain 
degree of permanence. Thus, more transient changes (e.g., 
fatigue) are not considered learning.
A final issue in this definition of learning that 
speaks directly to the present study concerns the emphasis 
in the definition on a change in knowledge or skill. This 
change has two components which are relevant here: the 
acquisition of skill (i.e., moving from no skill to some 
quantity of skill), and the transformation of existent 
skill (i.e., moving from novice to expert within a skill). 
The next section more fully explicates these two 
components.
The Acquisition of Skill
As has been noted above, the acquisition of skill is 
central to learning, which, in turn, is central to the 
success of any training program. The process of skill 
acquisition has received extensive attention in the 
cognitive learning literature. Fitts (1964; Fitts & 
Posner, 1967) divided the process of skill acquisition 
into three distinct stages. First, the cognitive stage 
represents the period in which the necessary skills are 
encoded such that a desired behavior may be attained.
These initial encodings are considered to be crude 
approximations of the desired behavior. Following this 
stage is a process of refinement which Fitts (1964) 
characterizes as the associative stage. It is in this 
stage that the initial approximations of the new skill 
become refined. Errors in initial encoding are identified 
and removed resulting in more efficient performance of the 
skill. Finally, the autonomous stage represents an 
extended, if not indefinite, period of continued 
improvement in the acquired skill. The distinguishing 
mark between the second and third stages is qualitative in 
nature. Individuals in the associative stage are 
"trouble-shooting" while individuals in the autonomous 
stage are "fine-tuning" their skills.
While these three stages may appear logical, it was 
the research of Anderson (1982) that first incorporated 
the framework into a systematic cognitive theory.
Anderson (1982) introduced two concepts that are central 
to his theory as well as to the research presented here: 
declarative and procedural knowledge. The first step in 
the skill acquisition process is the encoding of facts 
about the skill domain. These facts are termed 
declarative knowledge and are typically characterized as 
static (i.e., unchanging in content), flexible in their 
organization, and describable (Best, 1989). In sum, 
declarative knowledge consists of "knowing what"
statements. Suppose for example that my knowledge of 
bicycle riding consists of the following: performing the 
skill requires a bicycle; there are two pedals which are 
used to propel the rider; handle bars are used to steer 
the bicycle; gears are used to vary the ratio of the 
turning pedals with the wheel. All of these pieces of 
information may be termed declarative knowledge; they are 
static (i.e., these characteristics of bicycle riding are 
unlikely to change) and clearly describable. Further, I 
can use this information in a variety of ways. For 
example, if I were interested in categorizing forms of 
locomotion, my knowledge could serve to place "bicycle 
riding" in the category of "non-motorized locomotion." 
Alternatively, I may be interested in identifying all 
objects which have gears. Here my knowledge would place 
bicycles alongside other objects such as clocks, mills, 
and cars. My declarative knowledge of bicycle riding is 
therefore quite flexible in its application.
Sequential to declarative knowledge is the knowledge 
of methods, strategies, and approaches to the skill 
domain. Anderson (1982) terms these processes procedural 
knowledge or knowledge which is characterized by "knowing 
how" statements. In contrast to declarative knowledge, 
procedural knowledge is dynamic, skill specific (i.e., its 
organization is bound to one skill), and difficult to 
describe (Best, 1989). To continue with the previous
example, my procedural knowledge of bicycle riding might 
consist of the following: to propel the bicycle you have 
to sit on the seat, place your feet on the pedals, and 
churn your legs; to steer the bicycle you have to hold the 
handlebars and pull the arm associated with the direction 
you want to go towards you; to go faster you have to 
increase the gear ratio by lifting the gear lever (you 
will also have to exert more force in pedaling). My 
procedural knowledge of bicycle riding may change if, for 
example, I practice enough and determine that sitting on 
the seat is not a requirement for bicycle riding. In this 
sense procedural knowledge is considered to be dynamic.
The task specificity of my knowledge of bicycle riding is 
extensive; there are very few other situations in which my 
knowledge would be useful. Finally, as many would attest, 
it is much easier to show someone how to ride a bicycle 
than it is to describe how a bicycle is ridden.
As can be seen, declarative knowledge precedes 
procedural knowledge in that one must first possess facts 
about a skill before one can readily understand how to 
implement (or proceduralize) the skill. In keeping with 
the framework proposed by Fitts (1964), Anderson treats 
declarative knowledge as the first stage and procedural 
knowledge as the third stage. Intermittently, Anderson 
(1982) uses the term knowledge compilation to describe the 
processes involved in transmuting declarative knowledge to
procedural knowledge. Thus the declarative and procedural 
stages are characterized by the accumulation of 
declarative and procedural knowledge, respectively, while 
the knowledge compilation stage involves the process of 
practice with declarative knowledge to the point where it 
becomes procedural. In the following sections, I provide 
a discussion of each of the three major stages involved in 
knowledge acquisition.
The Declarative Knowledge Stage
As I mentioned above, the key feature of the 
declarative knowledge phase of skill acquisition involves 
the encoding of facts about the task. Anderson (1982) 
points out that information processing at this stage is 
not guided by procedures for encoding. As such, learners 
must apply their own general and fallible procedures to 
the information in the hopes of correctly interpreting the 
information. The method of interpretation at this stage 
involves a series of weak-method (or general purpose) 
problem solving strategies which may be utilized for all 
learning situations (Anderson, 1987; Glaser & Bassok,
1989; Gray & Orasanu, 1987). These strategies represent 
the methods individuals use to work out puzzling new 
situations. Since the situation is novel, the strategies 
are termed "weak-methods" because they have not been 
refined to fit the specific problem. Weak-method problem 
solving methods act on declarative knowledge in a method
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analogous to a computer's interpreter program.
Information presented to the learner (or interpreter) is 
assembled and deciphered in light of the given situation 
or problem state. Just as the process of mastering a new 
skill involves the mastery of procedures for conducting 
that skill, individuals may also possess skills (i.e., 
weak-method strategies) for learning skills.
The use of weak-method problem solving strategies by 
individuals in the declarative knowledge stage suggests 
two other characteristics of this stage. First, Kanfer 
and Ackerman (1989) point out that a hallmark of the 
declarative knowledge stage is a heightening of the 
attentional resource demands placed on the learner. 
Examples of the types of activities that place these 
demands on the learner include observation of others 
performing the task, encoding of task rules, and 
compilation of production rules (i.e., condition-action 
pairings) for task performance (Anderson, 1982? 1985; 
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
A second by-product of these weak-method strategies 
is their slow, error-prone nature. Individuals engaged in 
the process of encoding new information are likely to make 
numerous errors in comprehension of the information, 
appropriate application of rules, and correct utilization 
of strategies for information encoding (Anderson, 1982). 
All of these factors are due to the "newness" of the task
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for the learner. Further, encoding by definition places 
extensive demands on short-term memory. It is not until 
the skill has been proceduralized and stored in long-term 
memory that these demands will be eased.
To summarize, the flexibility and applicability of 
weak-method solutions offers a distinct advantage to the 
initial declarative knowledge stage. However, along with 
this flexibility come disadvantages associated with 
attentional demands and the application of error prone 
strategies. Once the information has become adequately 
encoded, there is a need to increase processing 
efficiency; this mechanism is knowledge compilation.
The Knowledge Compilation Stage
The dominant feature of the knowledge compilation 
stage is practice. Information stored in the first phase 
of skill acquisition is utilized in a more rapid and 
efficient manner (Anderson, 1982). According to Anderson 
(1982), there are three key mechanisms involved in this 
stage: an increase in performance speed, a decrease in 
verbal rehearsal of stored declarative knowledge, and a 
loss of point-to-point (or piecemeal) application of 
encoded information. Fisk and his colleagues (Fisk & 
Schneider, 1983; Fisk, Ackerman, and Schneider, 1987) have 
also noted increases in performance speed, as well as 
increased accuracy and transference of procedures from 
short- to long-term memory as key behavioral examples of
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the knowledge compilation process. Another feature of 
this stage is a noted decrease in the attentional demands 
of the learner (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Anderson (1982) describes two key processes involved 
in this stage. Knowledge taken from the declarative stage 
may be processed either by composition or 
proceduralization. In composition, declarative 
information that is temporally related (i.e., information 
that occurs serially in time) is pieced together into 
sequences. Composition allows for increased processing 
speed since information is stored sequentially rather than 
as a series of distinct pieces of information.
Proceduralization involves drawing on and storing the 
essential features of a piece of information as a 
representation of that knowledge (Anderson, 1982). Thus, 
while the full detail of the declarative knowledge may not 
be readily accessible, proceduralization allows the 
essence of the information to be captured thus permitting 
more rapid recall. As can be seen, the characteristic 
advantages of these two key processes differ. Composition 
speeds sequenced processing by decreasing the number of 
pieces of information that must be processed whereas 
proceduralization decreases memory workload (Anderson,
1982). In sum, these two processes, through extensive 
practice, form the beginnings of procedural knowledge.
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The Procedural Knowledge Stage
The transition from knowledge compilation to 
procedural knowledge is characterized not so much in terms 
of quantity of information processing but more in terms of 
quality. Continuing with the computer analogy presented 
above, computers have programs which compile interpreted 
(or object) code into faster, accurate, domain-specific 
procedures. Similarly, the declarative knowledge stage 
serves to interpret (using weak method problem solving 
strategies) code (declarative knowledge) which is compiled 
(proceduralized) in the procedural knowledge phase (Gray & 
Orasanu, 1987). Coming out of the knowledge compilation 
phase, the learner has accrued information sufficient to 
perform the task rapidly. However, the hallmark of 
procedural knowledge lies in the accuracy of the 
information. Shiffrin and Schneider's (1977) landmark 
article on automatic and controlled information processing 
refers to the automaticity with which experts perform 
tasks. This feature of information processing is 
congruent with Anderson's (1982; 1985) conception of 
procedural knowledge. Experts not only retrieve 
information via automatic processes, but they also show a 
great deal of accuracy in the application of the retrieved 
information. Anderson (1982) and Rumelhart and Norman 
(1978) use the term tuning to describe the processes which 
portray the increases in accuracy found in this phase.
The tuning mechanism discussed by Anderson (1982) and 
Rumelhart and Norman (1978) is characterized by three key 
procedures. First, learners with procedural knowledge 
show a widening generalizability in the application of 
procedures. Second, these learners increase the power of 
the discrimination rules that guide the appropriate 
application of the procedures. That is, individuals with 
procedural knowledge simultaneously increase the span of 
applicability of their rules to different instances 
requiring their use, and make the criterion for when the 
rule is to be applied more rigorous. Consequent to the 
first two procedures, the process of adjusting the 
strengths of rules is a third mechanism involved in 
tuning. Through experience in applying procedural 
knowledge, learners at this stage adjust the strength of 
the procedural rules such that weaker rules are removed 
from memory thereby increasing processing efficiency.
As an example, let us consider bicycle riding again. 
My intent is to determine the necessity of the bicycle 
seat toward the skill of bicycle riding. Let us further 
assume that I have acquired the knowledge that I do not 
need a bicycle seat to ride my bicycle. As I practice 
with other people's bicycles, I develop a rule that states 
that bicycle seats are not required for bicycle riding 
regardless of the owner of the bicycle. Thus I have 
widened the applicability of my rule. To illustrate the
second component of the tuning mechanism, let us further 
suppose that in applying my rule I discover that seats are 
helpful to the extent that they provide some rest for my 
legs on long rides. Rather than weakening the strength of 
my rule or limiting the applicability of the rule, I would 
in all likelihood make the criterion for application of my 
rule more rigorous. I might say then that bicycles seats 
are not necessary for bicycle riding on short distances, 
thereby making the application criterion more rigorous 
without affecting the generalizability (i.e., the rule 
still applies to all bicycles) or strength of the rule 
itself. Finally, the strength component of the tuning 
mechanism may be increased through continued practice 
using different bicycles and different riding distances. 
The new rule will increase in strength with every 
successful application.
Summary
The review of cognitive learning theory provided 
above has been tailored toward the literature focusing on 
knowledge acquisition. For a more comprehensive review of 
other elements in cognitive learning theory, I direct you 
to the reviews of Weiss (1990) or Glaser and Bassock 
(1989). The intent of this section has been to provide 
the reader with a basis in the key learning variables for 
the present study: declarative and procedural knowledge.
Social Learning Theory
The area of training in psychology is often 
characterized as paradoxical in nature (Muchinsky, 1990). 
The field is seen as critically important for success in 
organizations (Baldwin & Ford, 1988) yet lacking in 
adequate theoretical and empirical research (Campbell, 
1971). Recent works have contributed greatly toward 
improving the organization and structure of the training 
field (e.g., Goldstein, 1989; 1993), yet there remains a 
marked lack of definitive research from which 
practitioners may draw upon in implementing training 
programs.
The sub-area within training that is of interest in 
the present study concerns the methodology used to train 
employees. Goldstein (1993) discusses numerous methods 
ranging from the traditional lecture and on-the-job 
methods to more modern forms such as programmed 
instruction, computer-aided instruction, simulations, and 
behavior modeling training. According to Goldstein 
(1993), it is the latter method, behavior modeling 
training, that has received the most research attention in 
recent years. Latham (1989) offers the interactionist 
perspective inherent in social learning theory (and hence 
in behavior modeling training) as the primary reason for 
the popularity of this approach. By incorporating 
cognition and behavior as well as the moderating influence
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of the environment, Bandura's (1986) social learning 
theory is able to provide an approach that is accessible 
to a broad spectrum of researchers. Below I provide an 
overview of social learning theory, the basis for behavior 
modeling training, followed by a discussion of the 
particular aspects of the methodology itself. The 
concluding portion of this review highlights those aspects 
of behavior modeling training that are particularly 
relevant to the present study.
Social Learning Theory
Social learning theory emerged out of attempts to 
incorporate imitative behavior within a conditioning 
paradigm (Miller & Dollard, 1941). Following these 
attempts, the landmark research of Bandura and Walters 
(1963) shifted the theoretical focus of such research 
toward the phenomenon of observational learning (or 
modeling). However, as Weiss (1990) points out, the 
characteristics of observational learning in the Bandurian 
approach are markedly more cognitive in focus than other, 
more traditional, reinforcement-oriented views (e.g., 
Mowrer, 1950). This cognitive focus weighs heavily in the 
development of the present study.
Bandura (1986) makes two key delineations of the 
modeling construct which are instructive. First, the 
result of observational learning must be the development 
of a new knowledge structure. Instances of instinctive
reaction, behavioral contagion (e.g., yawning), social 
facilitation, and social loafing are not considered to be 
within the scope of observational learning (Weiss, 1990). 
Second, and most important, modeling represents a 
distinctively different mode of learning from that of 
direct experience. Although direct experience (also 
called enactive learning) is a viable form of learning (to 
the extent that the outcomes attained are roughly 
comparable to outcomes attained via other methods of 
learning), Bandura (1986) believes that enactive learning 
suffers greatly in terms of the efficiency of information 
processing it offers. Bandura asserts that such trial- 
and-error learning is inferior to the process of observing 
others' behavior (and the resultant outcomes of that 
behavior) which forms the impetus for modeling.
With these distinctions in mind, Bandura's 
theoretical approach may be outlined as the combination of 
four interrelated sub-processes: attention, retention, 
production (or reproduction), and motivation (Bandura,
1986). The first of these processes, attention, is 
prerequisite to the onset of modeling. Bandura (1986) 
outlines several variables that influence the degree of 
attention the observer will expend toward the observation 
of a behavior. These variables can be divided into four 
categories. First, properties of the behavior that is to 
be modeled such as discriminating ability, salience, and
behavioral complexity influence attention. Second, 
valences and expectations for the occurrence of future 
behavior that are attached by the observer can influence 
attention. Similarly, individual differences of the 
observer can play a role in attention. For example, Weiss 
(1978; 1990) notes that the extent to which one is an 
active or passive observer is largely influenced by the 
motivating effect of low self-esteem. I note that 
attitudes toward computers can be construed as an example 
of an individual differences variable that may influence 
attention in computer training. The hypothesized role of 
these attitudes in the context of behavior modeling 
training will be discussed below. Characteristics of the 
situation are a final variable that influences attention. 
Situations may act to constrain the amount of attention 
the observer may allocate to the observation of behavior.
Given that the variables discussed above enable the 
individual to sufficiently attend to a behavior, the 
second key process in social learning theory involves the 
retention of observed behavior in memory. This stage 
borrows heavily from the cognitive realm. Bandura (1986) 
invokes the constructs of symbolic coding, categorization, 
and rehearsal as the operative processes in retaining 
modeled behavior. Further, in keeping with the 
interactionist's perspective, retention is influenced by 
the cognitive skills and structures of the individual.
Following retention, the observer of modeling must 
make a transition from attended to and symbolically 
encoded behavioral observation to the production of 
behavior. In what is perhaps the most critical process 
involved in social learning theory, the production phase 
forms the critical cross-over from cognition to behavior 
(Weiss, 1990). Four key sub-processes drive the 
transition from cognition (encoded observation) to 
behavior (enactment). First, the individual must have an 
accurate cognitive representation of the methods of 
combination and sequencing of behavior which forms the 
task. Subsequently, the individual must observe 
behavioral enactments of this representation to adequately 
classify the desired behavior. The degree of fit between 
these behavioral enactments and the individual's cognitive 
representation is consequently gauged by feedback 
information from the environment. The result of feedback­
moderated comparisons between cognitive depictions and 
behavioral enactments forms the final critical process: 
conception matching. The process of conception matching 
is in turn moderated by individual characteristics such as 
physical abilities and skills (Bandura, 1986).
The successful completion of the first three stages 
in Bandura's theory insures that learning has taken place. 
However, the distinction between learning a behavior and 
the actual performance of that behavior invokes the need
for the fourth process in social learning theory: 
motivation. Bandura (1986) uses the synonymous term 
"incentive" to characterize those aspects which motivate 
the modeling observer to enact learned behavior. The most 
widely recognized of these incentives is the phenomenon of 
vicarious experience which has repeatedly been shown to 
increase modeled behavior (Weiss, 1990). Other 
incentives, Bandura argues, may emerge from external 
sources (e.g., social incentives, sensory input 
incentives) as well as internal sources (e.g., self- 
evaluation) . As is the case with all of Bandura's 
modeling processes, the motivation phase is moderated by 
individual differences. The most notable of these 
differences is the self-efficacy construct which dictates 
the amount of effort an individual will exert toward a 
given task, and the amount of persistence in the face of 
adversity the individual will endure (Bandura, 1977). 
Bandura (1986) suggests that individual differences such 
as self-efficacy may dictate the learner's preferences for 
particular types of incentives, internal standards, and 
social comparison biases.
To summarize Bandura's social learning theory, 
individuals engage in four temporally ordered processes in 
learning and performance. An observer must first attend 
to the presented stimulus, then properly encode in memory 
the essential elements of the observed behavior.
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Subsequently, the individual must transfer the encoded 
information from memory to action. Finally, the 
likelihood of enacted learned behavior is dependent upon 
the degree of motivation the observer has to enact the 
behavior.
Behavior Modeling Training
The learning method associated with and developed 
from social learning theory has been termed behavior 
modeling training. Original research using behavior 
modeling techniques emerged most frequently in the 
treatment of phobic individuals (e.g., Bandura, 1977). 
Latham (1989) points out that widespread application of 
behavior modeling training in organizations has been 
limited primarily to the area of leadership skills. 
Goldstein and Sorcher's (1974) text on leadership t ARAR 
* (is an example of this focus which also represents one of 
the first applications of Bandura's social learning theory 
to training in organizations.
Research on behavior modeling training as a technique 
typically uses the four major steps of social learning 
theory (attention, retention, production, and motivation) 
discussed above as a framework for the methodology.
Decker and Nathan (1985) provide an excellent text for the 
implementation of behavior modeling training programs. As 
an example of a typical behavior modeling methodology, I 
offer the supervisor training research of Latham and Saari
(1979). Individuals in the Latham and Saari study were 
first introduced to the topic by the trainers. Here the 
attentional processes of the trainees are activated in 
concurrence with the first step in Bandura's theory. The 
second phase in social learning theory, retention 
processes, was activated by having individuals observe a 
model demonstrating key learning points. In addition to 
the behavioral observation, the learning points were 
presented to the trainees both before and after the model 
presentation. Following the observation of the model, 
trainees met as a group to discuss the effectiveness of 
the model thereby further encouraging retention.
Following this phase, trainees engaged in role-playing 
activities which served the dual purpose of further 
retention and motor production of the modeled behavior.
The final step in the training program involved providing 
trainee feedback on performance of the trained behaviors. 
This step served as the motivation phase in Bandura's 
theory.
Results from the Latham and Saari (1979) training 
program were evaluated using Kirkpatrick's (1976) levels 
of training criteria which evaluate studies based on: 
trainee reaction to the training, degree to which the 
trained material was learned, transfer of learned material 
to performance on the job, and value of the training 
program to the organization as a whole. Latham and Saari
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(1979) found evidence in favor of behavior modeling 
training at all criterion levels.
In general, support for the effectiveness of behavior 
modeling training in organizations has been widespread.
The research of Meyer and Raich (1983) found full support 
for the effectiveness of behavior modeling training. 
Russel, Wexley, and Hunter (1984) found that behavior 
modeling training elicited positive reactions from 
trainees and proved to be an effective method in terms of 
learning criteria. However, results failed to find 
support for the transfer of learned behavior to 
performance on the job. Encouragement for the training 
methodology is evidenced in the meta-analytic research of 
Burke and Day (1986) who found behavior modeling training 
to be an effective means of training employees across a 
wide array of organizations and situations.
Other researchers have examined the various 
components of behavior modeling training in an attempt to 
identify what aspects make the methodology effective. The 
research of Decker (1980; 1982; 1983; 1984) identified 
behavioral rehearsal and social reinforcement as 
components that could enhance the already effective 
process of modeling. Further, Hogan, Hakel, and Decker 
(1986) found that trainee rule code generation (as opposed 
to trainer provided rules) enhanced subject's learning of 
modeled behavior. Finally, Gist and her colleagues have
amassed several empirical and theoretical examinations of 
the role of self-efficacy in behavior modeling training 
(Gist, 1987; 1989; Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 1991; Gist 
and Mitchell, 1992). Results from this research have 
indicated that an individual's perceived self-efficacy is 
enhanced through the use of modeling interventions.
To summarize the research and theory on social 
learning, one can say with a certain degree of confidence 
that the principles put forth by Bandura have received 
extensive support. Within the field of industrial 
psychology, research examining the components of social 
learning theory continues unabated. The subsequent 
section follows this vein in an attempt to integrate 
social learning phenomena with cognitive learning theory.
Integrating Cognitive and Social Learning Theory
Based on the reviews of cognitive and social learning 
theory presented above, it would seem apparent that the 
two theories have a considerable amount in common. Not 
only are both theories focused on learning, but they also 
have cognitive factors as the central aspects of their 
respective approaches. Therefore, one might expect that 
distinctions such as procedural and declarative knowledge 
would play a part in social learning theory. Conversely, 
one might also expect that researchers in knowledge 
acquisition would include the observation of modeled 
behavior as important to their approach. However, this 
theoretical integration has not occurred in the literature 
thus far.
The cognitive learning area appears to center its 
focus around micro-level issues in learning (e.g., expert- 
novice problem solving strategies). Further, Tversky 
(1982) noted that cognitive investigators moved the focus 
away from holistic approaches of learning toward more 
memory based examinations. Consequently, cognitive 
learning researchers tend to downplay issues related to 
which methods yield the greatest gains in learning. 
Although Tversky (1982) makes the observation that a re- 
emergent interest in more traditional learning areas is 
occurring, an examination of recent reviews in learning 
(e.g., Weiss, 1990) indicates that segregation of
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cognitive and social learning theories still occurs. As a 
whole then, cognitive learning research may be seen as 
predominantly centered on micro-focal issues in learning.
Kanfer and Ackerman's (1989) work on knowledge 
acquisition in industrial training marks the rare 
exception of research which examines cognitive learning 
variables with varied training methodologies. 
Interestingly, Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) note that skill 
acquisition in the initial declarative knowledge phase is 
typically aided by techniques such as the specification of 
task objectives, instruction on the task, observation of 
others, encoding of task rules, and development of 
strategies for task performance. Thus, although research 
in cognitive learning theory does not explicitly examine 
training techniques, there is a noted parallel between the 
techniques used to encourage knowledge acquisition and the 
procedures underlying behavior modeling training. It is 
this parallel that marks the focus of my integration.
In my review of behavior modeling training, I was 
surprised to note Bandura's position on cognitive learning 
theory. According to Bandura (1986), "(c)onstruing 
learning in terms of factual and procedural knowledge is 
well suited for cognitive problem solving. But there are 
many domains of activity that require additional 
mechanisms to get from knowledge structures to proficient
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action" (p. 107). While Bandura does capture the micro- 
focal nature of much of cognitive learning theory, his 
position belies this statement to a considerable extent. 
Below I provide several examples which demonstrate how 
Bandura's (1986) social-cognitive approach overlaps with 
key aspects of Anderson's (1982) skill acquisition 
research.
The first parallel that may be drawn between the two 
learning theories concerns how knowledge and skill are 
related. Bandura argues that knowledge and cognitive 
skills are necessary but insufficient prerequisites for 
performance skill. That is, knowing what something is 
(declarative knowledge) and knowing how to do something 
(procedural knowledge) do not guarantee that one can in 
fact perform. However, Bandura (1986) notes that the 
acquisition of performance skill requires a "conception- 
matching mechanism" which, using information attained from 
"physical enactment" (i.e., task practice), guides the 
transfer from knowledge to performance. The term 
"physical enactment" has clear parallels in cognitive 
learning theory's second phase of skill acquisition.
Recall that once individuals acquire declarative knowledge 
about a task, there is a period of intensive practice or 
rehearsal known as the knowledge compilation phase. 
Therefore, Anderson (1982) would agree with Bandura (1986) 
in stating that the acquisition of performance skill
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requires extensive practice with the task itself. To call 
on an adage: “practice makes perfect."
A second parallel between the two theories has 
already been alluded to: Bandura's (1986) conception- 
matching mechanism is in many ways similar to Anderson's 
(1982) production system-based tuning mechanism. In both 
approaches, the key element involves using acquired 
knowledge coupled with practice at a skill to formulate 
rules of action. Bandura (1986) claims that the essence 
of learning lies in obtaining generalizable rules which 
can be applied to novel instances. This method of 
learning is markedly similar to the processes underlying 
procedural knowledge. Recall that Anderson's (1982) 
tuning mechanism, which guides the acquisition of 
procedural knowledge, serves to aid in the creation of 
generalizable or widely applicable rules. Both theories 
suggest that a singular mechanism drives the formation of 
generalizable rules which are the quintessence of 
learning. Further, Bandura states that judgments require 
reasoning from propositional knowledge. Cast in light of 
cognitive learning theory, judgments require the 
integration of condition-action rules (i.e., 
propositions). Bandura (1986) also claims that the 
conceptions involved in conception-matching (the process 
of transferring knowledge to skill) are rules of action 
which provide guidelines for skilled performance. The
author further notes that procedural rules are required 
for skilled performance. In sum, it is the opinion of 
both Bandura and Anderson that the path to skilled 
performance lies in the acquisition of procedural 
knowledge.
A third and final tie between cognitive and social 
learning theory concerns a variety of modes of learning 
and common mediating cognitive processes. These modes c 
learning include modeling, conditioning, verbal 
instruction, and enactive exploration. Bandura (1986) 
asserts that each of the modes are characterized by how 
they convey information about rules of action. Further, 
the author notes that, whereas the various forms of 
learning differ in the information they present to the 
perceiver, they are all mediated by the process of 
conception-matching.
In a similar vein, Anderson (1982) uses the term 
"weak-method problem solving” to refer to the common 
mediating processes by which novices approach problems. 
Novices encounter information from a variety of sources 
all of which receive the same strategic application of 
problem solving methods. Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) 
indicate that individuals in the process of acquiring 
declarative knowledge frequently encounter modes of 
learning such as task instruction, observation of 
demonstrations, strategy development, and task rule
encoding and storage. The acquisition of knowledge from 
these modes of learning is mediated by weak-method problem 
solving strategies. Clearly, these modes of learning, 
borrowed from cognitive learning theory, have strong 
parallels with social learning theory's learning modes. 
While weak-method problem solving strategies do not 
directly correspond to conception-matching mechanisms, the 
gist of the argument lies in proposing that both theories 
allow for the input of several modes of learning which are 
treated by the same central processor.
The three parallels presented above suggest a 
possible integration of the typically micro-focal 
cognitive learning theory with the more applicable social 
learning theory. In essence, the processes which depict 
how learning occurs (i.e., via the generation of rules) 
appear congruous, the mechanisms which guide skilled 
performance appear to be similar, and the approaches to 
the attainment of performance coincide with each other.
One of the primary objectives of the present study is to 
ascertain whether the concepts from these two theories may 
be integrated in the same design.
Relations Between Computer Knowledge and Performance 
On several occasions I have mentioned the link 
between task knowledge and task performance. Obviously, 
one can expect that some degree of knowledge about the 
fundamental components of the task will aid in task 
performance. The relationship between knowing and doing 
(i.e., performing) is clear when one considers the 
straightforward and flexible (i.e., widely applicable) 
concept of declarative knowledge. Here I expected that 
knowledge of facts about the task (declarative knowledge) 
would logically relate to task performance. However, I 
also realize that the relationship between declarative 
knowledge and performance is far from perfect. Turning 
again to the bicycle riding example, my knowledge of the 
names of the different parts of a bicycle and a knowledge 
of their purpose does not guarantee that I know how to 
ride bicycles. Therefore, I expected a moderate effect 
for the declarative knowledge to performance relationship. 
My first hypothesis suggests that:
Hypothesis la: The relationship between 
declarative knowledge and task performance will 
be significant, positive, and moderate in effect 
size.
Turning to procedural knowledge, I expected the link 
between knowing how to perform a task and actual
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performance to be exceedingly strong. This relationship 
is so strong that researchers in the cognitive realm have 
essentially eguated the two. That is, procedural 
knowledge is typically measured through performance. It 
is my belief that, while highly related, procedural 
knowledge and performance are not identical. While it is 
true that one who possesses procedural knowledge for a 
skill can not necessarily perform the skill, the converse 
is more than likely false. With rare exception, an 
individual who can perform a skill must obviously know how 
that skill is performed.
One example of how procedural knowledge and 
performance might not correspond involves the implicit 
nature of procedural knowledge. Individuals with 
procedural knowledge may be unable to adeguately describe 
their task performance (i.e., produce their existent 
internal procedural knowledge in an external fashion).
The problem appears to lie in relating an internal event 
(task knowledge) with an external event (task 
performance). From this we may conclude that one source 
of error in the relationship between a procedural 
knowledge test and a measure of task performance is 
measurement error. That is, the lack of a perfect 
relation between the two variables is due in part to a 
lack of reliability in the measurement of internal 
procedural knowledge.
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A second rationale for the high relationship between 
procedural knowledge and task performance is the already 
discussed novice-expert distinction in knowledge 
acquisition. Individuals in the declarative knowledge 
phase have performance that is slow and error-prone 
(Glaser & Bassok, 1989; Gray & Orasanu, 1987; Kanfer £ 
Ackerman, 1989). Conversely, individuals in the 
procedural knowledge phase have, by virtue of their 
experience, greater performance in terms of both speed and 
accuracy (Anderson, 1982).
To summarize, procedural knowledge tests and measures 
of performance may be construed as two imperfect measures 
of the same construct. A procedural knowledge test can 
not adequately address the implicit aspects of the 
procedural knowledge construct whereas performance can.
On the other hand, performance assesses procedural 
knowledge by examining outcomes rather than directly 
measuring knowledge of how tasks are performed.
Therefore, I predicted that:
Hypothesis lb: The relationship between 
procedural knowledge and task performance will 
be significant, positive, and strong (large 
effect size).
Given the temporal nature of the two knowledge 
variables (i.e., declarative knowledge precedes procedural
knowledge) as well as the evidence presented above for the 
superiority of procedural knowledge in terms of its 
relation to performance, the third part of my first 
hypothesis followed:
Hypothesis lc: The relationship between 
procedural knowledge and task performance will 
be significantly greater than the relationship 
between declarative knowledge and task 
performance.
Knowledge Acquisition and Computer Training
Recall that on the outset of the present effort I 
endeavored to establish a theoretical base for research in 
computer technology training. Further, I noted that my 
interest lies in understanding training with computers for 
the sake of computer learning as well as for an 
understanding of theoretical issues in learning. It is my 
attempt to establish some evidence for both.
I should point out that the use of computer training 
as the vehicle for examining research questions on 
technology in general, and cognitive and social learning 
theory specifically, is purposeful. Even though computers 
are the most pervasive of technologies in the workplace, 
there remains a dearth of knowledge on how individuals 
learn how to use computers. The appropriateness of 
computers as a tool to examine the two learning theories 
presented above is suggested by two lines of evidence. 
First, empirical evidence (presented below) as well as 
personal experience has identified modeling as important 
to an individual's understanding of how computers work.
Second, the distinction between declarative and 
procedural knowledge (see above) and the measurement of 
the two constructs is much clearer when one considers 
computer technology. Declarative knowledge of computers 
is exacting and necessary; there are numerous facts one 
must know to successfully operate computers. Further,
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while procedural knowledge is typically difficult to 
describe (e.g., how does one swing a golf club so that the 
ball travels far and straight), this is not the case when 
one considers computers. Judging on past experience, I 
find knowledge of how to perform tasks on the computer to 
be highly explicit in nature. The distinctiveness of 
computer knowledge has the added benefit of increasing the 
correspondence between procedural knowledge and 
performance. Therefore, computer technology can be seen 
as an appropriate centerpiece for research on both 
cognitive and social learning theory. This section lays 
out the existent research related to computer technology 
training. The theoretical integration of the two learning 
theories is interwoven within this discussion.
Computer Training
Research has shown that the findings implicating 
behavior modeling training as a superior training 
methodology (e.g., Burke & Day, 1986; Latham & Saari,
1979; Meyer 6 Raich, 1983; Russel et al., 1984) hold true 
for computer training as well. Two studies conducted by 
Gist and her colleagues (Gist, Rosen, & Schwoerer, 1988; 
Gist, Schwoerer, & Rosen, 1989) have indicated that 
behavior modeling training significantly improves 
performance on computer software mastery over traditional 
computer tutorial approaches.
In the Gist et ai. (1988; 1989) studies, behavior 
modeling training consisted of three steps. First, 
trainees were provided with key learning points to 
facilitate retention and rule code generation (Decker, 
1982). Second, trainees observed a videotaped model 
demonstrating the behaviors required for task performance. 
Finally, trainees were given the opportunity to imitate 
the model's behavior through a series of practice sessions 
(i.e., enactive mastery). In contrast to this approach, 
the tutorial method consisted of a form of computer-aided 
instruction. The purpose of computer-aided instruction is 
to provide illustrative examples, programmed instruction, 
repetitive practice, and subsequent feedback on 
performance all through the computer medium (Goldstein, 
1993). Tutorial trainees and modeling trainees received 
identical information, examples, and practice time. The 
only difference between the groups was that the modeling 
condition would pause in the process of the training 
session to observe the model engaging in the behaviors of 
the task at hand. Thus the tutorial method is essentially 
a lecture method provided by computers (i.e., a "tell" 
approach) whereas the modeling method is a lecture method 
provided by computers plus a videotaped model (i.e., a 
"tell and show" approach).
The second set of hypotheses in the present study 
modify and extend previous evidence for the superiority of
behavior modeling training in computer tasks provided by 
Gist et al. (1988; 1989). Following the evidence provided 
above, I expected behavior modeling training to 
significantly improve knowledge of computer tasks over 
other methods. Note that the modification of previous 
research lies in the distinction I made between knowledge 
and performance. Whereas improvements in task performance 
implicate increases in task knowledge, task performance 
does not directly assess task knowledge (see the 
discussion on pp. 36-37). Further distinguishing this 
hypothesis was the measurement of two types of knowledge. 
In addition to indirectly measuring procedural knowledge 
through task performance, I directly measured both 
declarative and procedural knowledge.
The extension of the previous research lies in the 
more thorough examination I offered of the components of 
modeling training. In addition to examining groups 
similar to the two used in the Gist et al. (1988; 1989) 
studies (i.e., lecture-modeling-practice, and lecture- 
practice), I added two groups to the study; 1) a no 
lecture group which only received practice on the task, 
and 2) a modeling-only group which received modeling along 
with task practice but did not receive a lecture. The 
addition of these two groups provided me with the 
opportunity to examine the lecture and modeling components 
of social learning theory in a fully crossed design. That
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is, both modeling and lecture methods may be examined with 
and without the benefit of their counterparts.
Knowledge Types. Modeling Training, and Lecture Training 
Assuming that subjects are randomly selected, there 
should be no differences between the four training 
conditions (modeling plus lecture, modeling only, lecture 
only, and no lecture) in the pre-test assessment of 
knowledge. Therefore, all the hypotheses in the following 
section should reflect significant gains in the two types 
of knowledge (i.e., interactions).
In the context of the present study, the presentation 
of key learning points can be seen as an effort to 
transfer declarative knowledge to the trainees. That is, 
key learning points are the facts about the particular 
tasks. Therefore, one would expect lecture trainees to 
show increases in declarative knowledge as a result of 
training. Further, the observation of a model allows for 
a less overt yet still meaningful reception of facts about 
the task. As such, I also expected modeling trainees to 
possess greater declarative knowledge at post-test. Thus 
I predicted that:
Hypothesis 2a: Trainees receiving behavior 
modeling training will gain significantly 
greater declarative knowledge than trainees 
receiving no modeling.
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Hypothesis 2b: Trainees receiving a lecture will 
gain significantly greater declarative knowledge 
than trainees receiving no lecture.
Recall from the integration of cognitive and social 
learning theory that the processes which lead to learning 
in the Bandurian sense have been shown to be similar to 
the processes which effect increases in procedural 
knowledge. Further, procedural knowledge is acquired 
through practice with the application of declarative 
knowledge (Anderson, 1982). Therefore, one would expect 
all training conditions to show some increases in 
procedural knowledge as a result of task practice.
Trainees who receive more declarative knowledge (i.e., 
through the lecture), however, should have more procedural 
knowledge since the latter is generated from the former 
(Anderson, 1982) ; the more fuel one has (declarative 
knowledge), the more fire (procedural knowledge) that can 
be created.
To further differentiate the training conditions, one 
would expect that any interventions that facilitate 
trainee knowledge of how the task is performed (i.e., 
behavior modeling training) would necessarily aid in the 
acquisition of procedural knowledge. Evidence for the 
role of behavior modeling training in improving learning 
criteria and performance over other methods has already
been mentioned (e.g., Latham & Saari, 1979). Further,
Gist et al. (1988; 1989) provide evidence that behavior 
modeling training leads to increased knowledge of how to 
perform tasks (as measured by task performance). Finally, 
Best (1989) points out that "procedural knowledge... is 
more easily shown to someone than it is told" (p. 7). 
Behavior modeling training clearly advocates showing 
(modeling) as superior to simply telling. Therefore by 
virtue of observing models applying their declarative 
knowledge to specific tasks, one would expect increases in 
procedural knowledge that are greater than increases 
solely on the basis of task practice with declarative 
knowledge. As such, the three components of my third 
hypothesis were:
Hypothesis 3a: Trainees receiving behavior 
modeling training will gain more procedural 
knowledge than trainees receiving no modeling. 
Hypothesis 3b: Trainees who receive a lecture 
will gain greater procedural knowledge than 
trainees receiving no lecture.
Hypothesis 3c: Trainees receiving behavior 
modeling training (with or without a lecture) 
will have greater gains in procedural knowledge 
than trainees receiving only a lecture.
Computer Attitudes and Computer Training 
As mentioned above, the two major research bases 
encountered in the computer literature are training and 
attitudes. The goal of the present section is to bring 
the attitude research into the fold of computer training. 
Previous work which addresses attitudes within a training 
context tends to focus on attitudes toward the training 
program (Goldstein, 1993). This research seeks to use 
attitudes as a means of determining the quality of the 
training program (i.e., the reaction criteria?
Kirkpatrick, 1976). Further, even within the relatively 
small computer training literature, studies incorporating 
attitudes tend to examine reactions to the training 
program (e.g., Gist et al., 1989) rather than reactions to 
the training content per se. In contrast to this 
approach, my interest was in examining changes in 
attitudes as a function of training and the impact of a 
priori attitudes on training outcomes.
Effects of Computer Training on Computer Attitudes
Parsons (1988) indicates that training in technology 
should, like other training programs, begin with an 
assessment of the needs of the trainees. Further, the 
author suggests that, in addition to skills training, the 
attitudes of the individual toward technology are an 
important factor to consider. In reviewing the literature 
on attitudes toward computers, I found that individuals'
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beliefs concerning computers tend to fall along two 
distinct dimensions: 1) the belief that the computer is a 
beneficial tool to be used by humans, and 2) the belief 
that the computer is an autonomous entity capable of 
replacing humans at work (Lee, 1970; Zoltan & Chapanis, 
1982; Rafaeli, 1986). Empirical applications of this bi- 
dimensional perspective exist (Coovert & Goldstein, 1980; 
Kerber, 1983; Brock, 1991). Further, recent research 
using a confirmatory factor analytic framework has 
indicated support for the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the two constructs (Brock & Sulsky, in press).
It is interesting to note that, despite the continued 
evidence that individuals have two distinct reactions to 
computers, little research has been conducted to directly 
examine the development and change of computer attitudes. 
Rafaeli (1986) and Brock and Sulsky (in press) found 
computer use to be a significant predictor of both 
beneficial tool beliefs and autonomous entity beliefs. 
Additionally, research has indicated that computer 
avoidance reactions (e.g., phobias, anxieties, and fears), 
which are related to autonomous entity beliefs, are also 
significantly negatively related to computer use 
(Hudiberg, 1989; Nickell & Pinto, 1986; Rosen, Sears, & 
Weil, 1987; Zakrajsek, Waters, Popovich, Craft, & Hampton, 
1990).
Regarding the proposal that beneficial tool beliefs 
result from using computers, Hill, Smith, and Mann (1987) 
found that previous experience with computers, when 
mediated by efficacy beliefs, was the best predictor of 
decisions to use computers in the future. Results from 
their study suggest that the important determinant of 
future computer use was not experience alone, but the 
beliefs individuals brought with them from the experience. 
Brock (1991) found efficacy beliefs (using the same 
measure as Hill et al., 1987) to be strongly related to 
beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool. Thus, 
indirect support exists to suggest that beliefs about the 
computer are influenced by computer experience.
Recent research by Martocchio (1992) suggests a link 
between attitudes toward computers and computer training. 
Using Dutton and Jackson's (1987) framework for decision 
making, Martocchio (1992) outlined reactions to computer 
usage in terms of threats and opportunities. Threats and 
opportunities are similar to autonomous entity beliefs and 
beneficial tool beliefs, respectively. That is, believing 
that the computer is an autonomous entity implies that the 
computer is somehow threatening; believing that the 
computer is a beneficial tool intimates a conviction that 
the computer may provide the individual with opportunities 
in the future. Results from Martocchio's (1992) research 
indicated that computer training significantly reduced
4 8
computer anxieties and increased efficacy beliefs.
Further, these findings were moderated by perceptions of 
the computer such that individuals perceiving computer 
usage as an opportunity evinced significantly more change 
in anxiety and efficacy than individuals who perceived 
computer use to be a threat.
Based on the evidence provided by Martocchio (1992) 
as well as the research indicating that experience with 
computers relates to attitudes toward computers (Hill et 
al., 1987; Rafaeli, 1986; Brock, 1991), I proposed that 
computer training increases trainee's beliefs in the 
computer as a beneficial tool while simultaneously 
tempering trainee autonomous entity beliefs. My first 
hypotheses linking computer attitudes and computer 
training follow:
Hypothesis 4a: Trainees will experience an
increase in beneficial tool beliefs as a result 
of practice and training programs.
Hypothesis 4b: Trainees will experience a
decrease in autonomous entity beliefs as a 
result of practice and training programs.
The preceding hypotheses argue that exposure to 
computers (through training) alters an individual's 
attitudes. Following from this line of thought, I will 
endeavor to demonstrate how behavior modeling training may
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influence attitudes more so than other training forms.
Two lines of evidence support the argument that 
individuals in behavior modeling training can expect more 
attitude change: one relates to beneficial tool (or 
positive) attitudes toward computers and the other relates 
to autonomous entity (or negative) attitudes toward 
computers.
Regarding beneficial tool attitudes toward computers, 
my research has indicated a strong association between 
beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool and computer 
self-efficacy (Brock, 1991). Within a consistency theory 
framework (e.g., Bern, 1972), it is easy to see how 
increased beliefs in one's ability to perform (i.e., self- 
efficacy) lead to more positive views of the object or 
task one is performing upon. That is, to remain 
consistent, computer efficacious individuals will be more 
likely to hold positive views toward computers.
Continuing with this line of thought, evidence suggests 
that behavior modeling training is one of the most 
effective methods for the enhancement of self-efficacy 
(Bandura & Adams, 1977; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977). 
This evidence suggests that individuals who receive 
modeling will have more beneficial tool beliefs than 
individuals not receiving modeling training. The first 
portion of my fifth hypothesis follows:
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Hypothesis 5a; Trainees receiving modeling will 
experience greater increases in beneficial tool 
attitudes than trainees who do not receive 
modeling.
Turning to the effects of behavior modeling training 
on negative or autonomous entity beliefs about computers, 
the strongest support for this hypothesis emerges from the 
already noted association between autonomous entity 
beliefs and computer avoidance reactions (see p. 47). 
Beliefs in the computer as an autonomous entity capable of 
supplanting humans are related to computer fears and 
anxieties both empirically (Hudiberg, 1989,' Nickell & 
Pinto, 1986; Rosen, et al., 1987; Zakrajsek, et al., 1990) 
and logically (i.e, the idea of an "autonomous entity" 
evokes feelings of anxiety). The idea that behavior 
modeling training can mitigate these fears more so than 
other training methods has support in the social learning 
theory literature. Indeed, the empirical basis for social 
learning theory emerged out of clinical research on the 
treatment of snake phobias which found behavior modeling 
training to be an effective means of alleviating these 
fears (Bandura, Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969). Transferring 
this research to the computer domain, I hypothesized that 
fear, anxiety, and avoidance of computers (as measured by 
autonomous entity attitudes toward computers) would be
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mitigated most readily in modeling approaches. The latter 
portion of my fifth hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 5b: Trainees receiving modeling will
experience greater decreases in autonomous 
entity attitudes than trainees who do not 
receive modeling.
Computer Attitudinal Effects on Learning
The previous discussion centered on how the 
experience of training in general, and behavior modeling 
training in specific, might influence attitudinal change. 
The final hypothesis in this study examined how computer 
attitudes might influence computer learning. Research 
suggests that highly accessible attitudes influence an 
individual's interpretation of and response to a situation 
(Fazio, 1986; 1989). Clearly in this research, attitudes 
toward computers can be seen as salient given the context 
(i.e., computer training), and these attitudes are likely 
to be easily accessed (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
Therefore, theoretical support for the idea that attitudes 
toward computers can influence computer behavior exists.
As mentioned above (see pp. 21-22), two key elements 
of behavior modeling training are the amount of attention 
devoted to the task and the amount of motivation to 
perform the task (Bandura, 1986). Further, both task 
attention and motivation to learn are influenced by the
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individual's feelings about the task content. Since the 
focus of this effort is on learning how to use computers, 
attitudes toward computers can be construed as an 
important and motivating individual differences variable 
in training.
In the cognitive learning framework, one of the 
hallmarks of the declarative knowledge stage is heightened 
attention toward the task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 
Therefore, attitudes toward computers may influence 
learning by affecting attention and hence the amount of 
declarative knowledge acquired by the trainee. Motivation 
toward task performance also plays a key role in learning. 
Since procedural knowledge is necessary for skilled 
performance, it seems logical to expect that factors that 
influence task performance (i.e., motivation) will 
necessarily influence procedural knowledge. Thus I also 
expect increases in learning through the effects of 
increased motivation toward the task. Consequently, the 
influence of attitudes toward computers on motivation may 
play a role in the acquisition of procedural knowledge.
Empirical support for this position lies in 
Martocchio's (1992) research which found that trainees who 
perceived computer usage as an opportunity evinced 
significantly greater learning than trainees who perceived 
computer usage to be a threat. Thus I expect that 
opportunity-minded individuals (i.e., trainees who
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perceive the computer to be a beneficial tool) will 
acquire more computer knowledge. Conversely, trainees who 
perceive computers as a threat (i.e., an autonomous 
entity) will likely acquire less computer knowledge. 
Therefore, the first two components of my final hypothesis 
assert that:
Hypothesis 6a: Beliefs that the computer is a
beneficial tool will be associated with higher 
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
Hypothesis 6b: Beliefs that the ccuupi-ter is an
autonomous entity will be associated with lower 
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
In addition to the separate influence of beneficial 
tool and autonomous entity attitudes on learning, I expect 
that beneficial tool attitudes will moderate the effects 
of autonomous entity attitudes on learning.
Unfortunately, Martocchio's (1992) research design was 
such that it did not allow for the determination of an 
interaction between perceptions of threats and 
opportunities on training outcomes. Further, other 
research using beneficial tool and autonomous entity 
beliefs in the same design with computer use has treated 
the attitude constructs as dependent variables thereby 
making the identification of an interaction impossible 
(Rafaeli, 1986).
My own research (Brock, 1993) suggests that the two 
computer attitudes interact in their effect on computer 
use. As can be seen seen in Figure 1, the form of the 
interaction is such that individuals who possess few 
beneficial tool attitudes are unlikely to use computers 
regardless of their autonomous entity beliefs. Further, 
when beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool are 
high, computer use is also high. However, the combination 
of high beneficial tool beliefs with low autonomous entity 
beliefs is associated with higher amounts of self-reported 
computer use than high scores on both attitude dimensions 
separately. Therefore, indirect support for an attitude 
interaction on learning exists. Since it is logical to 
expect that the more one uses computers, the more one will 
learn, I expect that, by inference to computer use, the 
two computer attitudes will interact on computer learning 
as well. Therefore, my final hypothesis predicts that: 
Hypothesis 6c: Beliefs that the computer is a
beneficial tool and that the computer is an 
autonomous entity will interact in their effects 
on computer knowledge acquisition. Autonomous 
entity beliefs will be negatively correlated 
with knowledge acquisition when beneficial tool 
beliefs are high, but unrelated when beneficial 
tool beliefs are low (see Figure 1 for an 
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Figure 1
Computer Attitude Interaction on Computer Use in Brock 
(1993)
Summary
The present study examines: 1) how concepts from 
cognitive and social learning theory may be integrated in 
the same training framework, and 2) how this relationship 
operates within the context of technology as 
operationalized by computers.
The first hypothesis in the study examines relations 
between declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and
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performance. Here I expect both forms of knowledge to be
predictive of computer performance. However, procedural
knowledge should have a significantly greater relationship
to task performance.
Regarding the integration of cognitive and social
learning theory within the context of technology, I have
hypothesized effects for both computer training and
attitudes toward computers. My second and third
hypotheses examine the effects of training methodology on
two types of knowledge acquired by trainees. Lecture and
modeling interventions are hypothesized to produce
significant increases in declarative knowledge whereas
behavior modeling training is expected to be a superior
methodology for the acquisition of procedural knowledge.
The final three hypotheses in the study explore the
relation between attitudes toward computers, training
methodology, and knowledge acquisition. The fourth and
fifth hypotheses examine how the training experience and,
specifically, the training methodology influence attitudes
toward computers. The final hypothesis examines the role
attitudes toward computers have in predicting knowledge
acquisition. A summary of all the hypotheses for the
study follows:
Hypothesis la: The relationship between 
declarative knowledge and task performance is 
significant, positive, and moderate in effect 
size.
Hypothesis lb: The relationship between 
procedural knowledge and task performance is 
significant, positive, and strong (large effect 
size).
Hypothesis 1c: The relationship between 
procedural knowledge and task performance is 
significantly greater than the relationship 
between declarative knowledge and task 
performance.
Hypothesis 2a: Trainees receiving behavior 
modeling training gain significantly greater 
declarative knowledge than trainees receiving no 
modeling.
Hypothesis 2b: Trainees receiving a lecture gain 
significantly greater declarative knowledge than 
trainees receiving no lecture.
Hypothesis 3a; Trainees receiving behavior 
modeling training gain more procedural knowledge 
than trainees receiving no modeling.
Hypothesis 3b; Trainees who receive a lecture 
gain greater procedural knowledge than trainees 
receiving no lecture.
Hypothesis 3c: Trainees receiving behavior 
modeling training (with or without a lecture) 
have greater gains in procedural knowledge than 
trainees receiving only a lecture.
Hypothesis 4a: Trainees experience an increase
in beneficial tool beliefs as a result of 
practice and training programs.
Hypothesis 4b: Trainees experience a decrease
in autonomous entity beliefs as a result of 
practice and training programs.
Hypothesis 5a: Trainees receiving modeling
experience greater increases in beneficial tool 
attitudes than trainees who do not receive 
modeling.
Hypothesis 5b: Trainees receiving modeling
experience greater decreases in autonomous 
entity attitudes than trainees who do not 
receive modeling.
Hypothesis 6a; Beliefs that the computer is a 
beneficial tool are associated with higher 
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
Hypothesis 6b: Beliefs that the computer is an
autonomous entity are associated with lower
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
Hypothesis 6c; Beliefs that the computer is a
beneficial tool and that the computer is an
autonomous entity interact in their effects on 
computer knowledge acquisition. Autonomous 
entity beliefs are negatively correlated with 
knowledge acquisition when beneficial tool 
beliefs are high, but unrelated when beneficial 
tool beliefs are low.
Method
Sample
Undergraduate students (n = 255) enrolled in 
psychology courses at Louisiana State University 
participated in the study in exchange for course credit. 
All subjects involved in the study participated 
voluntarily and were free to withdraw at any time. The 
sample composition was 58% female, the average age was 
20.9 years, and the average years of college education 
completed was 3.1. Approximately half (51%) of the 
respondents were employed. When asked what type of 
computer they most often used, 45% indicated that they 
used an IBM or compatible machine, 35% reported that they 
did not use computers, 12% used Apple or Macintosh 
computers, and 8% used some other form of computer. 
Respondents had an average of 1.9 years of experience with 
computers.
Procedure
Table 1 presents an overview of the procedure used in 
the study. Note that the training groups were crossed in 
a two by two design (modeling by lecture). Subjects 
participated in the study in groups ranging in size from 
eight to eighteen; individuals in each group performed the 
entire experiment together. Four groups participated in 




Breakdown of the Procedure Used to Assess the Hypotheses 
in the Present Study
Group Lecture Practice Modeling
Modeling Plus Lecture Yes Yes Yes
Lecture Only Yes Yes No
Modeling Only No Yes Yes
No Lecture No Yes No
groups each (modeling plus lecture n = 67, modeling only n 
= 67, and lecture only n = 65). Prior to the training, 
all participants were given 30 minutes to complete a 
series of four pre-test measures assessing their: 
beneficial tool attitudes, autonomous entity attitudes, 
declarative knowledge, and procedural knowledge. For all 
subjects, the computer attitude measures were administered 
first followed by the two measures of computer knowledge. 
Following the pre-test assessment, I briefed all 
individuals on the nature and goals of the experiment. 
Subsequent to the briefing, individuals in the modeling 
plus lecture and lecture conditions received a forty-five 
minute key learning points lecture concerning the 
fundamentals of DOS (Disk Operating System) based computer 
operation (see Appendix B and the description below). The
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key learning points lecture was videotaped and presented 
uniformly to all subjects. Research by Decker (1983) 
indicates that videotaped instruction is an effective 
means of presenting training information. This method can 
also alleviate any inadvertent biases due to slight 
differences in the information presented to subjects in 
different groups.
Upon completion of the key learning points lecture 
(or following the pre-test measures for subjects in the no 
lecture conditions), all subjects engaged in a one hour 
task practice session. The session covered all aspects of 
the content presented in the key learning points lecture. 
Subjects in the modeling conditions received behavior 
modeling training (via videotape) prior to each module of 
the practice session. Following the task practice, all 
subjects completed a post-test of the same four measures 
administered in the pre-test session. Additionally, a 
computer performance test (see below) was added to assess 
the trainees' transfer of learning from the training 
program to the actual execution of tasks.
I conducted all training sessions in the same 
computer lab in the psychology department at the 
university. Each subject had access to a computer with a 
keyboard and a monitor for the duration of the experiment. 
Administration of the task practice and computer 
performance test was achieved using a computer program I
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wrote specifically for the training program. All 
subjects, upon completion of the experiment, were 
debriefed as to the nature and purpose of the experiment. 
Key Learning Points Lecture
Unlike previous training efforts that have used 
specific computer software (e.g., Gist et al., 1988;
1989), this training program sought to provide subjects 
with more generalizable computer knowledge. Admittedly 
DOS is a software program, however, almost all IBM 
compatible personal computers in use today require DOS to 
operate; the same can not be said for other software 
programs (e.g., word processors, spreadsheets, databases). 
In order to determine the content of the training, I 
reviewed several instructional texts on DOS based computer 
operation. Based on this review and upon my own personal 
experience, I gleaned the ten most often used DOS commands 
and grouped them into four categories. The four 
categories and their corresponding commands are: simple 
commands (clearing the screen and setting the date and 
time), viewing files (use and content of the directory 
command and how to view the contents of a single file), 
rearranging files (copying, renaming, and removing files), 
and rearranging directories (changing, creating, and 
removing directories).
To facilitate the use of the commands discussed 
above, I gave trainees a brief introductory discussion of
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basic computer concepts such as byte storage, hard and 
floppy disks, directories, files, and programs. 
Subsequently, trainees were instructed on the meaning of 
the DOS prompt and the basic entry format used for all DOS 
commands (i.e., command-parameter(s)-enter).
The remainder of the forty-five minute lecture was 
dedicated to providing information on the 10 commands, 
their syntax, and their use and function. The goal of the 
lecture was to provide trainees with the facts and 
features of each command (i.e., declarative knowledge) 
such that a knowledge base would be present at the 
commencement of task practice. Appendix A outlines the 
content of the videotaped key learning points lecture.
Task Practice Session
The content of the task practice was identical for 
all subjects in the study, only the training method 
differed. Individuals received a series of tasks that 
directly corresponded to the key learning points lecture 
previously discussed. For each of the four task groups, 
subjects were presented with the commands to be practiced 
and the amount of time they would have to work on the 
tasks (e.g., "The following commands center around the 
simple commands used in the DOS environment. They include 
clearing the screen, finding the date and time on the 
computer, and changing the date and time on the computer. 
You have 7 minutes to practice these commands.").
To determine how much time I should allocate to the 
task practice, I pilot tested trainees using the no 
lecture training condition which afforded trainees with 
the least amount of information (n = 17). The four task 
group times were set at the pilot group's obtained mean 
plus one standard deviation. Table 2 presents a summary 
of the number of tasks and the allotted time for each of 
the four task groups. Additionally, I present means and 
standard deviations for the number of practice attempts 
trainees made for each of the task groups and the average 
time it took trainees to complete each task group.
Individuals were given a series of tasks to practice 
(e.g., "Change the date to May 3, 1992.") the number of 
which varied with the complexity of the task group and its 
respective commands. Following the presentation of each 
task, the subject was prompted for a response. In the 
event of an incorrect response, the computer gave subjects 
feedback in the form of: 1) a suggestion as to what type 
of error they had made (e.g., no space between command and 
parameter, command correct but parameters wrong, command 
typed incorrectly), 2) an indication of where in their 
response the error had occurred, and 3) the correct 
response. If the subject pressed enter or did not type 
the correct command, feedback was limited to suggesting 
which command was appropriate. Subjects continued on each 
task until they correctly responded or time expired.
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Table 2
Summary of Task Practice Attempts and Times bv Task Group
Pre-set Obtained by
Task Group Levels Trainees
Practice Attempts
Simple Commands 8 12.1 (3.4)
Viewing Files 15 38.3 (10.6)
Rearranging Files 11 22.5 (5.6)




Simple Commands 7 3.7 (1.6)
Viewing Files 20 15.6 (4.4)
Rearranging Files 8 5.1 (1.7)
Rearranging Directories 20 14.4 (4.5)
TOTAL 55 38.8
Note: n = 254. Standard 
Times are in minutes.
deviations are in parentheses.
Within each portion of the practice, tasks differed 
in the specific parameters required and increased in 
complexity. This last aspect served to both increase 
learning as well as to encourage trainees to begin to
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generalize their rules of how DOS commands work to a 
variety of instances. A description of the tasks 
presented to subjects in the practice session appears in 
Appendix B.
Modeling Intervention
In the modeling conditions, individuals viewed a 
videotaped presentation of an actor performing each task. 
Prior to commencement of instruction for each of the four 
task groups (simple DOS commands, viewing files, 
rearranging files, and rearranging directories), the 
computer program halted and told subjects that they would 
be given a demonstration of how the various commands 
actually work on the computer. The model described each 
of the commands within each task group separately. For 
each of the commands, the model: 1) defined and described 
the command, 2) told the subjects what he was going to do, 
3) discussed why the solution was effective, 4) performed 
the keystrokes (verbalizing as he went), 5) discussed the 
output on the monitor, and 6) used the directory command 
(when appropriate) to show the trainees the outcome of the 
command. This approach is very much akin to the "show and 
tell" methodology used by Gist et al. (1988; 1989) in
their computer training research. Following the model's 
presentation of the commands in a task group, subjects 
proceeded through the task in the same manner and with the 
same amount of time provided as participants in the other
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conditions thereby keeping the amount of practice time 
constant across groups. A transcript of one of the task 
group modeling interventions appears in Appendix C. 
Computer Knowledge Measures
I developed the computer knowledge measures using a 
point-to-point approach. That is, the content of the 
declarative and procedural knowledge measures was a direct 
outgrowth of the key learning points lecture and the task 
practice, respectively. Specifically, I used information 
acquired in the key learning points lecture as a basis for 
declarative knowledge item generation. Since procedural 
knowledge is primarily a result of practice, I logically 
derived the procedural knowledge test from the task 
practice session.
Declarative knowledge test. Recall that declarative 
knowledge involves a knowledge of facts or "knowing what" 
statements. The development of the declarative knowledge 
test followed along what may be considered traditional 
lines of test creation. That is, items on the test sought 
to determine whether trainees recalled the facts they were 
taught (e.g., "What is the command to remove a file from 
the computer?"). I scored the declarative knowledge test 
as the percent correct for the seventeen items that 
composed the scale (see Appendix D).
Procedural knowledge test. In contrast to 
declarative knowledge about computers in general and DOS
commands in specific, procedural knowledge addresses 
whether or not individuals know how to execute DOS 
commands. Therefore, the primary source for items 
generated for this test was the task practice session.
The key delineation between the procedural knowledge test 
and the declarative knowledge test can most easily be seen 
in the types of questions asked. For example, instead of 
asking subjects, "What is the command to remove a file 
from the computer?", I would ask, "How does one remove the 
file MYDAT.TXT from the OLD directory on the computer?"
The correct answer for the former is, "DEL", while the 
correct answer for the latter is, "Type DEL MYDAT.TXT and 
press enter." Again, the distinction is between knowing 
what the command is (declarative knowledge) and knowing 
how to execute the command (procedural knowledge).
Following Anderson's (1982) discussion of how 
individuals demonstrate their procedural knowledge, I also 
generated questions which sought to determine if subjects 
could generalize a principle from one DOS command to 
another. For example, in the lecture and task practice, 
subjects were presented with the application of the global 
wildcard characters (? and *) in the directory, copy, and 
delete commands. One test of the generalizability of 
trainee knowledge was an item which addressed the use of 
wildcard characters in the rename command.
Another demonstration of procedural knowledge 
mentioned by Anderson (1982) concerns how individuals with 
procedural knowledge arrive at more optimal solutions. 
Accordingly, I included some items which sought to 
determine if the trainee could arrive at the best solution 
to the problem. For example, question number 8 on the 
procedural knowledge test ("Assume that the directory DATA 
contains the files: ONE.XY, TRI.XX, FOR.XY, SIX.XX,
FIV.ZX, and TOO.XX. What is the fastest way to delete the 
files that have an XX extension?") could be optimally 
answered by: "Type DEL \DATA\*.XX and press enter." 
However, another correct answer would be: "Type DIR \DATA, 
press enter, look for all the files with a .XX extension, 
and delete each one using the command: DEL \DATA\ 
<filename> .XX." Thus, a third means of assessing 
procedural knowledge was to assess whether trainees knew 
the best way to execute the command.
Since the procedural knowledge test possessed more 
information than the declarative knowledge test and 
involved demonstrating the best solution, I scored the 
test using a two-point system. A score of two was 
obtained only for a precise response. Trainees received a 
score of one if: 1) their responses contained minor 
syntactical errors, 2) the response was sub-optimal, or 3) 
one of the major components was missing. Scores for all
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thirteen items were summed and transformed to a percent 
correct format (see Appendix E).
Pilot Testing. To determine the psychometric 
validity of the newly developed knowledge measures, I 
conducted a pilot study using undergraduates who 
participated in exchange for extra credit. The pilot 
study consisted of an administration of the two knowledge 
measures (n = 135) followed a week later by a lecture on 
computers (later to become the key learning points 
lecture) and a re-testing of computer knowledge (n = 53) 
using the same measures.
Results indicated that the declarative and procedural 
knowledge measures had strong internal consistency 
reliability at both pre-test and post-test assessment 
(pre-test a's = .84 for both knowledge tests; post-test 
a's = .88 and .90 for declarative and procedural 
knowledge, respectively). Further, test-retest 
reliability indicated strong and significant relationships 
for both declarative knowledge (r = .79, p < .01), and 
procedural knowledge (r = .74, p < .01). Finally, the 
measures were found to be highly interrelated at both 
testing periods (Epre.test's = .79, p < .01, r ^ . ^  = .91, p 
< .01).
An additional goal of the pilot study was to identify 
any test practice effects on computer knowledge. To 
examine this possibility, I performed a t-test comparing
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subjects who received pre-test knowledge assessments with 
subjects who only received a post-test on post-test 
declarative and procedural knowledge. Results were non­
significant for both measures indicating no practice 
effects.
Thus, the pilot study: 1) offered evidence for the 
stability and consistency of my declarative and procedural 
knowledge measures, and 2) mitigated possible threats to 
the internal validity of the training program due to 
testing effects. However, some concern as to the 
discriminant validity of the two measures is warranted 
given the strong relationship between the two measures. 
Specifically, one could argue that, based on the strength 
of this relationship, the procedural knowledge test is 
merely a more difficult test of declarative knowledge.
The alternative means of assessing procedural knowledge is 
to measure trainee performance which, in turn, has its 
faults. Given that performance is the execution of 
learned behavior rather than a measure of what is actually 
learned, it can also be construed as an imperfect measure 
of procedural knowledge. Therefore, the assessment of 
procedural knowledge is derived from two imperfect 
measures of the construct: 1) computer performance (a 




In addition to the assessment of computer knowledge 
and attitudes at post-testing, trainees were also given a 
computer performance test. As discussed above, the 
primary distinction between this test and the procedural 
knowledge test involves having the trainees actually 
execute the commands on the computer. In the procedural 
knowledge test, subjects were asked to describe the 
commands (or sequence of commands) used. In the task 
practice, trainees were given a specific task (e.g., 
"Remove the file STUFF.DAT from the DATA directory.") and 
feedback on the accuracy of their response. The computer 
performance test differed from both of these by requiring 
that trainees actually perform the task on the computer 
without receiving experimenter provided feedback (through 
the computer). Trainees were however free to check their 
work thereby providing themselves with feedback on their 
performance. For example, once the subject enters the 
command to remove a file, the directory command could be 
issued to determine if the file had indeed been deleted.
To determine the trainee's performance level, I utilized 
tasks which required trainees to integrate several of the 
commands they learned toward the solution of a goal task. 
For example, the task, "Remove the OLD directory," 
requires that the trainee: 1) remove all files and sub­
directories in the OLD directory, 2) change to a directory
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one level above where the OLD directory resides, and 3) 
remove the directory. Instructions and the list of tasks 
to be performed were presented to the trainee on a sheet 
of paper (see appendix F); trainees were given thirty-five 
(35) minutes to complete the task.
The computer recorded the commands entered and the 
time spent for each command. Using this information, I 
obtained three measures of performance. First, accuracy 
was computed as the total number of points awarded for 
correct execution. Scores were computed in a two step 
process. In the first step, the computer automatically 
scored each question based on both correct execution of 
the required steps and on the basis of incorrect steps 
(either doing more than required or doing what is required 
but to the wrong files or directories). In the second 
step, I examined the scoring scheme for any omissions in 
the process and wrote a program to correct those omissions 
accordingly.
Although accuracy is paramount, a consideration of 
the speed and efficiency with which trainees perform 
computer tasks is congruent with characterizations of 
procedural knowledge acquisition (Anderson, 1982). As 
such, my second measure of performance was performance 
speed which was calculated as the total time to complete 
the test weighted by the number of points scored. Since 
time alone cannot distinguish between trainees who finish
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quickly because they could not complete the test and 
trainees who are fast because they are knowledgeable, I 
deemed it necessary to operationalize speed as time per 
accuracy point scored. Similarly, performance efficiency 
was computed as the total number of commands entered 
weighted by the number of points scored in the accuracy 
measure.
Computer Attitude Measures
I derived the computer attitude measures from an item 
analysis of data collected by Brock (1993). In that 
study, I measured subjects' responses to 77 items from 5 
scales measuring attitudes toward computers. To reduce 
the number of items to a more manageable size, I examined 
item-total score correlations using two criteria for item 
retention: 1) a significant correlation greater than .40 
with the attitude dimension that the item was supposed to 
measure, and 2) a correlation less than .30 with the 
attitude dimension the item was not supposed to measure. 
Through this first step, the number of items was reduced 
from 77 to 37 with 15 items on the beneficial tool scale 
and 22 items on the autonomous entity scale.
Once this reduction was achieved, I computed internal 
consistency measures for the two scales. Chronbach's 
alphas were .84 and .91 for the beneficial tool and 
autonomous entity scales, respectively. To reduce the 
number of items on the two scales to a more reasonable
number, I removed all items with item-total score 
correlations less than .40 for the beneficial tool scale 
and .50 for the autonomous entity scale. The higher 
criterion for the autonomous entity scale was necessary 
due to the greater homogeneity of items on that scale as 
compared to the beneficial tool scale. This procedure 
reduced the number of items to 11 and 12 for the 
beneficial tool and autonomous entity scales, 
respectively. The revised alphas for the beneficial tool 
(a = .82) and autonomous entity (a = .90) scales remained 
substantially the same. An examination of the attitudes' 
relations with computer use indicated that the beneficial 
tool scale correlated .49 with computer use (p < .01) 
while the autonomous entity scale correlated -.23 with 
computer use (p < .01). The correlation between the 
scales was also significant (r = -.21, p < .01).
I also conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to 
determine the fit of the selected items to their 
respective factors. Using the EQS structural equations 
modeling program (Bentler, 1989) with a generalized least 
squares solution, each of the 23 items was hypothesized to 
load on its respective attitude dimensions. The 
correlation between the two dimensions was also estimated 
in the analysis. To demonstrate the fit of the 
hypothesized model, I used both the Xf_ goodness of fit 
statistic and the comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990).
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Results of the confirmatory factor analysis yielded a 
significant Xf_ goodness-of-fit index (XI = 363.1, df =
229, e  < .01) suggesting poor model fit. However, due to 
the sensitivity of the Xf_ test to sampl76(( ((and 
deviations from linearity and multivariate normality, I 
used the X2/df ratio as an alternative index. The X2/df 
ratio is 1.6 which is less than the 2.0 ratio needed to 
indicate acceptable fit (Byrne, 1989). Additionally, the 
comparative fit index was .99 indicating excellent fit 
between model and data. Finally, the obtained correlation 
between the dimensions corresponded closely to the value 
obtained by simply summing the scales (r = -.26, p < .01).
Visual inspection of the remaining items revealed two 
items on the autonomous entity scale with identical 
content and similar wording. One of these items was 
removed leaving a total of 22 attitude items (11 per 
scale). These items were presented to subjects in random 
order. The items used to assess attitudes toward 
computers in the present study are presented in Appendices 
G and H for the beneficial tool and autonomous entity 
scales, respectively.
Results
The primary independent variables in this study were: 
lecture condition (lecture versus no lecture), modeling 
condition (modeling versus no modeling), and time (pre­
test and post-test). Declarative knowledge, procedural 
knowledge, performance (accuracy, speed, and efficiency), 
beneficial tool computer attitudes, and autonomous entity 
computer attitudes served as dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 1 treated the computer knowledge variables as 
independent variables and Hypothesis 6 treated the 
computer attitude measures as independent variables. 
Measurement Adequacy and Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics, 
correlations, and reliabilities for all the variables in 
the study. All variables possessed acceptable internal 
consistency by established standards (i.e., a's > .70). 
Notably, the a's for the computer attitude measures 
compare favorably with the values obtained in the item 
analysis reported above (see pp. 75-76). The high alpha 
coefficient obtained for performance accuracy (a = .90) is 
encouraging as it supports the notion that the tasks 
within the test were homogenous in content, and also 
grants some validity to the automated scoring procedure 
used to assess trainee performance.
Since my measures of declarative and procedural 




Sample Sizes. Means. Standard Deviations. Correlations, 
and Internal Consistency Measures for All Study Variables
Variable n M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 PREBT 255 76.8 11.4 (.81)
2 PREAE 255 49.1 14.2 -.31 (.83)
3 PREDK 255 11.5 18.1 .23 -.33 (.89)
4 PREPfC 255 3.8 11.4 .20 -.24 .78 (.91)
5 POSTBT 253 77.8 12.9 .71 -.39 .27 .20 (.86)
6 POSTAE 253 47.4 14.4 -.36 .82 -.37 -.26 - .46 (.84)
7 POSTDK 254 52.5 21.8 .12 -.36 .60 .42 .27 -.40 (.84)
8 POSTPK 254 36.2 21.7 .17 -.35 «6o .48 .31 -.41 .79 (.87)
9 ACC 233 35.8 22.6 .15 -.31 .55 .43 .28 -.37 .77 .84 (.90)
10 SPEED 232 1.7 5.0 -.12 -.03 -.08 -.09 1 o 00 -.33 -.17 -.17 -.24
11 EFF 233 2.5 2.9 -.10 .10 -.19 -.13 -.08 .13 -.30 -.37 -.42
10 11
Note: Variables beginning with PRE are pre-test measures, 
variables beginning with POST are post-test measures. BT 
= Beneficial Tool, AE = Autonomous Entity, DK =
Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, ACC = 
Performance Accuracy, SPEED = Performance Speed, EFF = 
Performance Efficiency. All means and standard deviations 
are expressed as percentages except for speed (in minutes) 
and efficiency (in number of commands). Numbers in 
parentheses are Coefficient a's.
E < .05 for r's > ± .13. e < *01 for E's > - -17.
their internal consistency properties was more rigorous.
I submitted both knowledge tests using both pre-test and 
post-test assessments to principle components analyses 
with varimax rotations. Therefore, a total of four 
principle components analyses were conducted. In each 
instance, I compared a one factor solution to a two factor 
solution to assess which was more representative. As 
suggested by the high internal consistency coefficients 
for the knowledge measures (see Table 3), my analysis 
supported a one factor solution for both knowledge scales. 
The factor loadings for the pre- and post-test declarative 
and procedural knowledge tests appear in Appendix I.
Below I describe the factor analytic results.
The one-factor solution for pre-test declarative 
knowledge (Lambda = 7.0) accounted for 41.3 percent of the 
total variance. Further, most items loaded above the .30 
criterion suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1989; see 
Appendix I). The two factor solution (Lambda = 1.8) 
explained an additional 10.7% of the variance.
Examination of the rotated factor matrix revealed that 7 
of the 17 items loaded greater than .30 on both factors 
making the interpretation of a two-factor solution 
difficult. Further, one item (item 15) had a negative 
loading on the second factor indicating still greater 
difficulty in interpreting a two-factor solution.
80
Post-test declarative knowledge had a one factor 
solution that accounted for 28.3% of the variance among 
the items (Lambda = 4.8). The addition of a second factor 
contributed only 9.6% to the total variance explained and 
had an eigenvalue slightly greater than one (Lambda =
1.6). Examination of the factor loadings in the one- 
factor solution revealed a pattern similar to that 
observed at pre-test. All items loaded above .30 with the 
exception of item 16. Further, there is a demonstrated 
correspondence in the magnitude of the factor loadings 
between pre-test and post-test (see Appendix I) that is 
not found in the two-factor solution. That is, the 
relative ranking of the size of the factor loadings was 
stable from pre-test to post-test in the one-factor 
solution but not in the two-factor solution. I determined 
that a one-factor solution was most appropriate for the 
declarative knowledge test because: 1) the first factor 
eigenvalues were much larger than the second factor 
eigenvalues (at both pre-test and post-test), and 2) the 
pattern of factor loadings was confused in the two-factor 
solution and quite clear for the one-factor solution.
Results from the analysis of procedural knowledge 
were clearer than those for declarative knowledge. The 
one factor analysis for pre-test procedural knowledge 
yielded a large eigenvalue (Lambda = 7.4) which accounted 
for 56.6% of the variance among the items. The second
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factor (Lambda = 1.5) added 11.2% to the total variance 
explained. All factor loadings were above .30 in the one- 
factor solution. The two-factor solution yielded 7 of 13 
items which had high loadings on both factors. Thus, the 
interpretation of two distinct factors would be difficult. 
Further, two different items on each of the two factors 
loaded negatively. Finally, the second factor had 4 items 
which did not load above .30.
The post-test factor analysis revealed a one-factor 
solution that accounted for 41.9% of the total variance 
(Lambda = 5.5). The two-factor solution added 9.1% of the 
variance and, like the pre-test procedural knowledge 
measure, had an eigenvalue near one (Lambda = 1.2). The 
factor loadings for the one-factor solution were, with the 
exception of item 1, all greater than .30. The fact that 
the first item was simplest (i.e., nearly all trainees 
answered it correctly at post-test) probably contributed 
to the low variance for the item and hence a low factor 
loading. Examination of the rotated factor matrix for the 
two-factor post-test procedural knowledge test revealed 
that only the last two items loaded greater than .30 on 
the second factor. Items 3 and 7 had factor loadings 
greater than .30 on both factors and item 1 did not load 
on either factor.
Since specific aspects of procedural knowledge were 
addressed by a sub-set of the items, I also examined the
two-factor solution in terms of the interpretability of 
these items. Specifically, items 7, 8, and 12 asked 
subjects to describe the fastest or most efficient means 
of executing commands, and items 5 and 9 required subjects 
to generalize their knowledge to a new domain (see 
Appendix E). Items 7 and 12 did load greater than .30 on 
the second factor, but the remaining items mentioned above 
did not. Further, item 7 also loaded highly on the first 
factor. Hence, the items on the procedural knowledge test 
appear to fit best in a one-factor solution. At both pre­
test and post-test, one large factor emerged with 
unambiguous factor loadings. The addition of a second 
factor neither contributed substantially to the variance 
explained, nor added clarity to interpretation of the 
content of the scale.
In addition to the similar factor loadings in pre- 
and post-test knowledge measures, further evidence for the 
stability of the knowledge and attitude measures was 
obtained from test-retest correlations. All were 
significant and positive (declarative knowledge r = .60, p 
< .01; procedural knowledge r = .48, p < .01; beneficial 
tool beliefs r = .71, p < .01; autonomous entity r = .82,
P < .01). Correlations between the two types of knowledge 
remained stable and significant across time (pre-test r = 
.78, p < .01; post-test r = .79, p < .01). The 
significant negative relationship between the two types of
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attitudes at pre-test (r = -.31, p < .01) became stronger 
at post-test (r = -.46, p < .01) although not 
significantly more so.
Correlations between the different measures of 
performance, although significant, were relatively low in 
effect size (r2 ranged from .06 to .18). The low effect 
sizes were not surprising given that the measures of speed 
and efficiency had performance accuracy divided out in 
their calculations (a step analogous to partialling out 
accuracy variance). Consistent with the notion that 
performance is a measure of procedural knowledge, the 
relationship between post-test procedural knowledge and 
the primary measure of performance (accuracy) was very 
strong (r = .84, p < .01).
Tests of Hypotheses
Knowledge-Performance Relations. Hypothesis 1 
predicted significant relations between declarative 
knowledge and performance (la) and between procedural 
knowledge and performance (lb). Additionally, I expected 
procedural knowledge to be significantly more predictive 
of performance than declarative knowledge (1c). The 
correlations presented in Table 3 provide support for 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b. The post-test correlations between 
declarative knowledge and accuracy (r = .77, p < .01) and 
between procedural knowledge and accuracy (r = .84, p < 
.01) were both significant and positive. The other
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measures of performance (speed and efficiency) were 
significantly related to the post-test knowledge measures 
although their magnitudes were substantially smaller
(^H)K»SPEED ~  “«17, E < *05; E d K.eff =  ~.30, P  < .01? Ep|(.speed =  ~  
.17, p < .05? rp(joEFF = —.37, p < .01).
In order to explore all the components of Hypothesis 
1 in a single design, I conducted a series of regression 
analyses (see Table 4). Through these analyses I was able 
to: assess direct relations between declarative and 
procedural knowledge, determine effect sizes for the 
relationships between the two knowledge measures and 
performance, and measure the incremental predictiveness of 
procedural knowledge over declarative knowledge. The 
three performance measures (accuracy, speed, and 
efficiency) were used as dependent variables. For each 
measure, I analyzed two regression equations using 
declarative and procedural knowledge as independent 
variables. In the first equation, I entered declarative 
knowledge first followed by procedural knowledge. The 
second equation reversed the order of entry. Therefore, a 
total of 6 regression equations were analyzed.
The first analysis in Table 4 regressed performance 
accuracy on to declarative knowledge and then procedural 
knowledge. Entry of declarative knowledge on accuracy was 
significant (6 = .77, change in R2 = .59, p < .01). Entry 
of procedural knowledge in the second step significantly
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Table 4
Blocked Regressions for Declarative and Procedural 
Knowledge on Computer Performance Measures
Performance Measure Beta R2 Change in R2
Accuracy
DK First Step 1 - DK .77** .59 .59**
Step 2 - PK .61** .73 .14**
PK First Step 1 - PK .84** .70 .70**
Step 2 - DK . 29** .73 .03**
Speed
DK First Step 1 - DK -.17* . 03 .03*
Step 2 - PK -.09 .03 .00
PK First Step 1 - PK -.17* .03 .03*
Step 2 - DK -.10 .03 .00
Efficiency
DK First Step 1 - DK -.32** . 10 .10**
Step 2 - PK -.33** . 14 .04**
PK First Step 1 - PK -.37** .14 .14**
Step 2 - DK -.06 .14 .00
Note: Beta = Standardized beta weight. 
* = E < *05. ** = e  < .01.
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increased R2 (6 = .61, change in R2 = .14, p < .01). The 
next equation used the same dependent variable (accuracy) 
but reversed the order of entry of the knowledge measures. 
In this instance, procedural knowledge entered first and 
was significant (6 = .84, change in R2 = .70, p < .01). 
Entry of the declarative knowledge measure produced a 
significant 6 = .29 (p < .01) but small (3%) increase in 
R2 (p < .01)
In addition to using the primary measure of 
performance (accuracy), I also conducted regressions using 
speed and efficiency. The results for performance speed 
with declarative knowledge entered first were significant 
6 = -.17 (change in R2 = .03, p < .05). The addition of 
procedural knowledge was not significant (6 = .09, change 
in R2 = .00, ns). When procedural knowledge entered 
first, however, the beta and associated R2 were 
significant (6 = .-.17, change in R2 = .03, p < .05). The 
inclusion of declarative knowledge after procedural 
knowledge did not increase the prediction of performance 
speed (8 = -.10, change in R2 = .00, ns)
The final performance measure, efficiency, produced 
somewhat more interesting results. When declarative 
knowledge was entered first, the results were significant 
(6 = -.32, change in R2 = .10, p < .01). Further, the 
inclusion of procedural knowledge explained additional 
variance beyond declarative knowledge (6 = -.33, change in
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R2 = .04, e  < .01). When the order of entry was reversed, 
procedural knowledge was a significant predictor of 
performance efficiency (6 = -.37, change in R2 = .14, p < 
.01), but the inclusion of declarative knowledge in the 
second step was non-significant (6 = -.06, change in R2 =
.00, ns).
Results for Hypothesis 1 depended upon the type of 
performance measure used. Both knowledge variables, when 
entered first in the equation, were significant for all 
three performance measures which restates the 
correlational findings. Further, the effect sizes for 
performance accuracy were large for both declarative 
knowledge (R2 = .59) and procedural knowledge (R2 = .70). 
These two observations provide full support for Hypotheses 
lb. Although the declarative knowledge effect size was 
smaller than the procedural knowledge effect size, the 
effect was much larger than expected thereby indicating 
partial support for Hypothesis la.
Procedural knowledge contributed significant 
incremental variance each time it entered an equation in 
support of Hypothesis lc. However, declarative knowledge 
also contributed incremental variance to the prediction of 
performance accuracy indicating somewhat more mitigated 
support for this hypothesis. Using efficiency, procedural 
knowledge added significant variance when it was entered 
second whereas declarative knowledge did not thereby fully
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supporting Hypothesis lc. Thus, Hypothesis lb found full 
support whereas Hypotheses la and lc found strong but 
partial support.
Training Condition Hypotheses. Tables 5, 6, and 7 
present the results from the ANOVAs conducted to examine 
the second and third hypotheses which predicted gains in 
knowledge as a result of training methodology. The 
analyses were 2 (modeling versus no modeling) X 2 (lecture 
versus no lecture) X 2 (pre-test and post-test) mixed 
model ANOVAs. The first two factors were between 
subjects, the other, within subjects. When performance 
was used to assess procedural knowledge, the within 
subjects factor was removed from the analysis since there 
was no pre-test.
Hypothesis 2 stated that declarative knowledge would 
increase as a result of modeling training (2a) and lecture 
training (2b). Hypothesis 2a was supported by a 
significant time by modeling interaction (see Table 5).
The means and standard deviations for pre-test and post­
test declarative knowledge sub-grouped by training 
condition appear in Table 8. At post-test, individuals 
who received modeling scored significantly greater on 
declarative knowledge (M = 58.3) than those who did not 
receive modeling (M = 46.1; t252 = 4 . 6, p < .01) . Simple 
effects tests on the means in Table 8 revealed that no 
differences between modeling groups existed at pre-test
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Table 5
Modeling bv Lecture by Time ANOVA for Declarative 
Knowledge.
Effect df MS F
Modeling (M) 1 5707.7 9.1**
Lecture (L) 1 141.9 o • to
M X L 1 109. 0 0.2
Between Error 250 156129.5
Time (T) 1 208871.0 1394.1**
M X T 1 4040.8 27.0**
L X T 1 166.7 1.1
M X L X T 1 2.4 0.0
Within Error 250 149.8
Note: ** = p < *01.
(t253 = .4 , ns) . Individuals in both groups showed large 
increases in declarative knowledge from pre-test to post­
test (modeling: t132 = 28.8, p < .01; no modeling: t120 = 
24.5, p < .01). No lecture by time effect was found for 
declarative knowledge; Hypothesis 2b was not supported.
Hypothesis 3 stated that both modeling (3a) and 
lecture (3b) would produce significant gains in procedural 
knowledge. The ANOVA in Table 6 revealed a pattern of
Table 6
Modeling bv Lecture bv Time ANOVA for Procedural Knowledge
Using the Procedural Knowledge Test.
Effect df MS F
Modeling (M) 1 3513.4 8.6**
Lecture (L) 1 174.6 0.4
M X L 1 253.3 0.6
Between Error 250 409.5
Time (T) 1 129116.8 780.5**
M X T 1 4606.9 27.9**
L X T 1 248.0 1.5
M X L X T 1 22.4 0.1
Within Error 250 165.4
Note: * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.
results similar to those found for the second hypothesis. 
The means and standard deviations for pre-test and post­
test procedural knowledge sub-grouped by training 
condition appear in Table 9. In support of Hypothesis 3a, 
modeling was found to interact with time to produce 
significantly greater procedural knowledge at post-test 
(modeling M = 41.5, no modeling M = 30.3; t252 = 4 . 2, p < 
.01). Pre-test procedural knowledge means did not differ
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Table 7
Modeling bv Lecture ANOVA for Procedural Knowledge Using
Accuracy. Speed, and Efficiency Performance Measures.
Effect df MS F
Deoendent Variable = Accuracy
Modeling (M) 1 13801.0 31.1**
Lecture (L) 1 2031.0 4.6*
M X L 1 0.0 0.0
Error 229 443.8
Dependent Variable = Speed
Modeling (M) 1 189.9 7.7**
Lecture (L) 1 6.4 0.3
M X L 1 4.7 0.2
Error 228 24.7
Dependent Variable = Efficiency
Modeling (M) 1 12.9 1.6
Lecture (L) 1 27.3 3.3
M X L 1 15.5 1.9
Error 229 8.2
Note: * = e  < .05. ** = p < .01.
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Table 8
Pre-test and Post-test Declarative Knowledge Means and
Standard Deviations by Training Condition
Condition Lecture No Lecture Combined
Modeling
- Pre-test 11.4 (17.1) 12.5 (18.3) 11.9 (17.7)
- Post-test 58.9 (21.3) 57.8 (20.3) 58.3 (20.7)
No Modeling
- Pre-test 11.3 (18.5) 10.6 (18.9) 11.0 (18.6)
- Post-test 47.6 (21.9) 44.3 (20.6) 46.1 (21.3)
Combined
- Pre-test 11.4 (17.8) 11.6 (18.5)
- Post-test 53.3 (22.2) 51.7 (21.4)
NOTE: Abbreviations are the same <as in Table 3. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
between modeling and no modeling groups (t253 = 0 . 6, ns) . 
Tests of differences between the means in Table 9 
indicated significant gains in procedural knowledge over 
time for both modeling (t132 = 22.1, p < .01) and no 
modeling (t120 = 17.8, p < .01) groups.
The results for the lecture mirrored those in the 
analysis of declarative knowledge; the key learning points
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Table 9
Pre-test and Post-test Procedural Knowledge Means and
Standard Deviations bv Training Condition
Condition Lecture No Lecture Combined
Modeling
- Pre-test 2.8 ( 9.1) 4.1 (10.1) 3.4 ( 9.6)
- Post-test 41.8 (22.5) 41.1 (20.8) 41.5 (21.6)
No Modeling
- Pre-test 4.6 (14.2) 3.9 (12.0) 4.3 (13.2)
- Post-test 32.4 (21.8) 28.0 (18.6) 30.3 (20.4)
Combined
- Pre-test 3.7 (11.9) 4.0 (10.9)
- Post-test 37.1 (22.6) 35.1 (20.8)
NOTE: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.
lecture did not significantly increase trainee's 
procedural knowledge thereby failing to find support for 
Hypothesis 3b.
Table 7 presents the results from the analysis of 
procedural knowledge which used performance as the 
dependent measure. The means for the three performance 
measures (accuracy, speed, and efficiency) sub-grouped by
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training condition appear in Table 10. I conducted a 2 
(modeling versus no modeling) X 2 (lecture versus no 
lecture) ANOVA for each of the three performance measures 
(accuracy, speed, and efficiency).
Results from the analysis of accuracy (the primary 
measure of performance) indicated that both main effects 
were significant and the means were in the expected 
direction (modeling M = 42.7, no modeling M = 26.8; 
lecture M = 39.4, no lecture M = 32.7). Results from the 
analysis using speed as the dependent variable were 
significant for modeling (modeling M = 0.9, no modeling M 
= 2.7) but not for lecture. The efficiency ANOVA produced 
no significant effects. Therefore, using performance 
accuracy, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported; modeling 
and lecture both improved performance over no modeling and 
no lecture, respectively. The performance speed analysis 
supported Hypothesis 3a but not Hypothesis 3b whereas the 
efficiency analysis failed to support both hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3c stated that individuals with modeling 
(modeling plus lecture and modeling only) would have 
greater gains in procedural knowledge than individuals who 
only received a lecture. To examine this hypothesis, I 
performed a planned comparison of the two modeling groups 
against the lecture only group on the change in procedural 
knowledge from pre-test to post-test. Results from the 
analysis indicated that modeling was superior to lecture
Table 10
Accuracy. Speed, and Efficiency Means and Standard
Deviations bv Training Condition
Condition Lecture No Lecture Combined
Modeling
- Accuracy 45.7 (21.9) 39.7 (22.1) 2.7 (22.1)
- Speed 1.0 (2.3) 0.9 (1.1) 0.9 (1.8)
- Efficiency 2.1 (4.4) 2.2 (2.2) 2.2 (3.4)
No Modeling
- Accuracy 30.2 (22.1) 24.2 (17.8) 26.8 (19.9)
- Speed 3.1 (9.5) 2.4 (4.8) 2.7 (7.2)
- Efficiency 2.1 (1.1) 3.3 (2.3) 2.8 (2.0)
Combined
- Accuracy 39.3 (28.2) 32.7 (21.6)
- Speed 1.8 (6.4) 1.6 (3.4)
- Efficiency 2.1 (3.4) 2.8 (2.3)
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Speed = 
time in minutes to complete test divided by accuracy. 
Efficiency = commands entered for entire test divided by 
accuracy.
in providing trainees with procedural knowledge (F, 250 = 
13.9, p < .01). I also conducted the same test using 
performance as the dependent measure of procedural 
knowledge. For the performance accuracy measure, results 
from the planned comparison were congruent with those 
found in the procedural knowledge test analysis. Modeling 
trainees (M = 42.7) had significantly greater performance 
than lecture only trainees (M = 30.2; F, 229 = 15.5, p <
.01). The planned comparison which used speed as the 
dependent measure indicated that modeling trainees (M =
.9) performed faster than trainees who received only a 
lecture (M = 3.1; F, 228 = 6.2, p < .05) . When efficiency 
was used, the results were not significant (modeling: M = 
2.2; lecture: M = 2.1; F1 229 = . 1, ns) . Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3c was supported using the procedural knowledge 
test, performance accuracy, and performance speed, but was 
not supported using performance efficiency.
Attitude Change Hypotheses. Hypotheses 4 and 5 
addressed the effects of the training methods on trainee 
changes in attitudes toward computers. Specifically, 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that beneficial tool beliefs would 
increase from pre-test to post-test (4a) and autonomous 
entity beliefs would decrease from pre-test to post-test 
(4b). Hypothesis 5 predicted that modeling trainees would 
have greater gains in beneficial tool attitudes (5a) and 
greater losses in autonomous entity attitudes (5b) over no
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modeling trainees. To examine these hypotheses, I 
conducted two ANOVAs each using a 2 (modeling versus no 
modeling) by 2 (lecture versus no lecture) by 2 (pre-test 
and post-test) mixed model design. The ANOVA in Table 11 
used beneficial tool attitudes as the dependent measure. 
Table 12 presents the results from the ANOVA using 
autonomous entity attitudes as the dependent measure.
Hypothesis 4a, predicting an increase in beneficial 
tool attitudes over time, was not supported (see Table 
11). In Table 12, the significant main effect for time 
indicates support for Hypothesis 4b. Trainee autonomous 
entity beliefs were significantly reduced as a result of 
the practice and training programs (pre-test autonomous 
entity M = 49.1, post-test autonomous entity M = 47.4) .
Results from the analysis of Hypothesis 5 (predicting 
that trainees who received a modeling component would show 
more change in attitudes than trainees who did not receive 
modeling) were surprising. Tables 11 and 12 indicate that 
neither Hypothesis 5a nor Hypothesis 5b was supported. In 
both instances, the modeling by time interaction was non­
significant. However, for both beneficial tool and 
autonomous entity beliefs, the lecture by time interaction 
was significant. The means and standard deviations for 
pre-test and post-test attitudes broken down by training 
condition appear in Table 13 (beneficial tool) and Table 




Effect df MS F
Modeling (M) 1 3.1 0.0
Lecture (L) 1 3.7 0.1
M X L 1 149.3 2.0
Between Error 250 76.7
Time (T) 1 26.3 2.0
M X T 1 0.5 0.0
L X T 1 109.8 8.4**
M X L X T 1 2.6 0.2
Within Error 250 13.0
Note: ** = e  < .01.
tool beliefs increased from pre-test (M = 75.8) to post­
test (M = 78.5) for individuals who received lecture 
training (t129 = 3.2, p < .01) and did not change for 
trainees who did not receive a lecture (t122 = 1.1, ns) .
The means for the autonomous entity attitudes 
revealed an unexpected finding. Individuals who did not 
receive a lecture showed a decrease in autonomous entity 
beliefs from pre-test (M = 49.5) to post-test (M = 46.5,
Table 12
Modeling by Lecture bv Time ANOVA for Autonomous Entity 
Attitudes.
Effect df MS F
Modeling (M) 1 47.2 0.4
Lecture (L) 1 15.1 0.1
M X L 1 26.1 0.2
Between Error 250 114.2
Time (T) 1 101.0 9.3**
M X T 1 11.7 1.1
L X T 1 57.6 5.3*
M X L X T 1 40.9 3.8
Within Error 250 10.8
Note: * = p < .05. * * = £ ) <  .01.
t122 = 3.9, e  < .01). Lecture trainees did not change 
their autonomous entity attitudes (t129 = .5, ns) . An 
examination of the cell means in Table 14 reveals that the 
disparity between lecture and no lecture groups was 
particularly large in the groups that also received 
modeling. That is, modeling with no lecture produced the 
greatest decrease in autonomous entity beliefs. The 
inclusion of modeling as a possible component driving the
1 0 0
Table 13
Pre-test and Post-test Beneficial Tool Attitudes by 
Training Condition
Condition Lecture No Lecture Combined
Modeling
- Pre-test 76.5 (12.2) 77.0 (10.0) 76.8 (11.1)
- Post-test 79.4 (12.0) 75.8 (12.0) 77.6 (12.1)
No Modeling
- Pre-test 75.0 (13.5) 78.9 ( 9.2) 76.8 (11.8)
- Post-test 77.5 (15.0) 78.4 (12.4) 78.0 (13.8)
Combined
- Pre-test 75.8 (12.9) 77.9 ( 9.6)
- Post-test 78.5 (13.5) 77.0 (12.2)
NOTE: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.
strange results is suggested by the three-way interaction 
in Table 12 which was narrowly non-significant (exact p = 
.053). Although statistically speaking the interaction 
should not be interpreted, visual inspection of the means 
in Table 14 suggests that modeling without a lecture was 
most helpful in reducing autonomous entity attitudes. 
Based on the fact that: 1) the three-way interaction was 
narrowly non-significant, and 2) the differences between
1 0 1
Table 14
Pre-test and Post-test Autonomous Entity Attitudes bv 
Training Condition
Condition Lecture No Lecture Combined
Modeling
- Pre-test 47.5 (13.3) 50.0 (13.0) 48.8 (13.2)
- Post-test 47.7 (15.1) 45.6 (11.5) 46.6 (13.4)
No Modeling
- Pre-test 50.0 (14.7) 48.7 (16.1) 49.4 (15.3)
- Post-test 49.1 (15.3) 47.5 (15.8) 48.3 (15.5)
Combined
- Pre-test 48.8 (14.0) 49.5 (14.5)
- Post-test 48.4 (15.1) 46.5 (13.6)
NOTE: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.
the modeling only group's difference score, and all other 
group's change scores was so large, I chose to test this 
effect with a conservative post-hoc analysis. Using a 
Scheffe test for complex comparisons, I compared the 
modeling only group (post-test minus pre-test M = -4.4) to 
all other groups (post-test minus pre-test M = -.7) in 
terms of a change in autonomous entity attitudes from pre­
test to post-test and found that this was in fact the case
1 0 2
(— 3 249 = 9 * 7/ E < *05). Modeling without lecture training 
reduced trainee autonomous entity beliefs more so than any 
of the other training groups. Thus, partial support for 
Hypothesis 5b is warranted with a caveat noted for the use 
of a post-hoc procedure for a non-significant interaction.
The results suggest that: 1) lecture training 
increases beneficial tool attitudes, and 2) no lecture 
training decreases autonomous entity attitudes. The 
latter was unexpected given that exposure to a computer 
lecture should decrease these beliefs rather than leaving 
them unchanged. Modeling did not contribute to changes in 
trainee beneficial tool attitudes thereby failing to 
support Hypothesis 5a. Modeling only training did reduce 
trainee autonomous entity beliefs in support of Hypothesis 
5b, but the overall effect for modeling was non­
significant.
Knowledge Change as a Result of Attitudes. The final 
hypotheses in the study used attitudes in a predictive 
sense. Rather than identifying changes in attitudes as a 
result of training, I sought to determine if attitudes had 
any association with knowledge acquisition. The sixth 
hypothesis predicted that: high beneficial tool attitudes 
(at pre-test) would be associated with greater knowledge 
acquisition (6a); high autonomous entity attitudes (at 
pre-test) would be associated with lower levels of 
knowledge acquisition (6b); and the two attitudes would
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interact in their prediction of computer knowledge 
acquisition (6c). In Hypothesis 6c, I expected that 
autonomous entity beliefs would be related to knowledge 
acquisition only when beneficial tool attitudes were high.
To test Hypothesis 6, I performed a blocked 
regression analyses on each of five dependent measures: 
declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, performance 
accuracy, performance speed, and performance efficiency. 
For the analyses incorporating declarative and procedural 
knowledge, pre-test knowledge was entered first as a 
covariate. For all five regressions, the main effects of 
pre-test beneficial tool and autonomous entity attitudes 
were entered in the next step. The interaction of the two 
pre-test attitude measures was entered in the final block. 
Table 15 presents the regression results using the two 
knowledge tests as dependent measures. Table 16 
summarizes the results from the analyses using the three 
performance measures.
The analysis using declarative knowledge revealed 
that, after pre-test knowledge was factored out (6 = .60, 
change in R2 = .36, p < .01), the attitude main effects 
explained incremental variance (change in R2 = .04, p <
.01). Examination of the beta weights indicated that 
autonomous entity attitudes were negatively related to 
declarative knowledge (6 = -.23, p < .01) whereas 
beneficial tool attitudes were unrelated (6 = -.07, ns).
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Table 15
Multiple Regressions for Pre-test Beneficial Tool and 
Autonomous Entity Attitudes on Knowledge Acquisition
Knowledge Measure Beta R2 Changi
Dependent Variable = Declarative Knowledoe
Step 1 - Covariate .60** .36 .36**
Step 2 - Attitudes .40 .04**
- BT -.07
- AE -.23**
Step 3 - BT X AE . 10 .40 .00
Dependent Variable = Procedural Knowledae
Step 1 - Covariate .46** .22 .22**
Step 2 - Attitudes .29 .07**
- BT -.01
- AE -.28**
Step 3 - BT X AE . 13 .29 .00
Note: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3. Covariate 
is pre-test knowledge. Beta = Standardized beta weight.
* = E < .05. ** = p < .01.
The inclusion of the interaction between beneficial tool 
and autonomous entity attitudes on declarative knowledge 
was also not significant.
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Table 16
Multiple Regressions for Pre-test Beneficial Tool and 
Autonomous Entity Attitudes on Performance Measures
Knowledge Measure Beta R2 Change in R2
Dependent Variable = Accuracy
Step 1 - Attitudes . 10 .10**
- BT .06
- AE -.29**
Step 2 - BT X AE -.83* .12 .02*
Dependent Variable = Speed
Step 1 - Attitudes .02 .02
- BT -.15*
- AE -.08
Step 2 - BT X AE .72* .04 .02*
Dependent Variable = Efficiency
Step 1 -• Attitudes .02 .02
- BT -.08
- AE .07
Step 2 - BT X AE .35 .02 .00
Note: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3. Beta = 
Standardized beta weight.
* = P < .05. ** = p < .01.
106
The results from the second analysis were similar to 
the results from the first. The covariate pre-test 
procedural knowledge was significant (6 = .46, change in 
R2 = .22, p < .01) and the main effect of attitudes 
entered in the second step was significant (change in R2 = 
.07, p < •01). Analysis of the beta weights revealed that 
autonomous entity attitudes were related to procedural 
knowledge (6 = -.28, e < •01) whereas beneficial tool 
attitudes were not (6 = -.01, ns). Finally, the inclusion 
of the attitude interaction term was not significant.
The final analysis used performance as a measure of 
procedural knowledge acquisition. Since performance was 
assessed at post-test only, no covariate was available.
The entrance of the attitude main effects on accuracy was 
significant (change in R2 = .10, p < -01). Examination of 
the beta weights indicated that autonomous entity beliefs 
were negatively related to accuracy (6 = -.29, e < •01) 
whereas beneficial tool beliefs were unrelated to accuracy 
(6 = .06, ns). Unlike the previous analyses, the 
inclusion of the interaction term resulted in a 
significant increase in explained variance (£ = -.83, 
change in R2 = .02, p < -05).
The other measures of performance produced somewhat 
more ambiguous results. When performance speed was 
regressed on to attitudes, the results were non­
significant (R2 = .02, ns). Examination of the beta
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weights revealed that beneficial tool attitudes bore a 
significant negative relationship to performance (6 = - 
.15, p < .05) indicating that trainees with high pre-test 
beneficial tool attitudes performed faster. Autonomous 
entity attitudes were not significantly related to 
performance speed (6 = -.08, ns). The inclusion of the 
attitude interaction term did not contribute incremental 
variance to the prediction of performance speed (£ = .72, 
change in R2 = .02, ns). The results for the final 
regression analysis using performance efficiency as the 
dependent measure were non-significant for the entrance of 
attitudes (beneficial tool: £ = -.08, ns: autonomous 
entity: £ = .07, ns: R2 = .02, ns) and for the inclusion 
of the interaction term (£ = .35, change in R2 = .00, ns).
Across both computer knowledge tests and the primary 
measure of performance (accuracy), support for Hypothesis 
6b is evident. Each time autonomous entity attitudes 
entered the equation they predicted knowledge. Trainees 
with initially high autonomous entity beliefs had smaller 
gains in computer knowledge than trainees with low pre­
test autonomous entity beliefs. The lack of support for 
Hypothesis 6a is also evident. Only the speed regression 
analysis revealed a relationship between pre-test 
beneficial tool beliefs and computer knowledge.
Hypothesis 6c was only supported in the analysis 
using performance accuracy as the dependent measures. To
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assure that the form of the interaction obtained was 
congruent with the hypothesized interaction (see Figure 
1), I plotted the interaction between the two attitudes on 
performance accuracy (see Figure 2) . To fully test 
Hypothesis 6c, I conducted simple effects tests using one 
standard deviation above and below the mean as my 
conditional values for high and low beneficial tool 
beliefs, respectively.
The relationship between autonomous entity attitudes 
and procedural knowledge (as measured by performance 
accuracy) was significant and negative when beneficial 
tool beliefs were high (6 = -.65, t = -11.0, p < .01).
When beneficial tool beliefs were low, autonomous entity 
beliefs were unrelated to performance (8 = -.26, t = -1.9, 
ns). Given that performance accuracy was the only measure 
of trainee computer knowledge in which attitudes 
interacted significantly, the results suggest rather weak 
support for this final hypothesis.
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Computer Attitude Interaction on Performance Accuracy
Discussion
Using computers as its focus, this study examined 
several factors involved in technology training in an 
effort to bring psychological research on technology up to 
pace with the pervasiveness of technology in the 
workplace. Within the framework of computer training, I 
incorporated ideas from two popular theories of human 
learning: cognitive learning theory and social learning 
theory. From the cognitive learning theory literature, I 
integrated the concepts of declarative knowledge (knowing 
what) and procedural knowledge (knowing how). Behavior 
modeling training, the training pedagogy used in social 
learning theory, was chosen as the focal training method 
for my study. In addition to exploring how the two 
learning theories functioned in the context of computer 
training, I also examined two attitudes toward computers. 
Both the impact of these attitudes on computer learning, 
as well as the effects of training (and behavioral 
modeling training specifically) on attitudes were 
explored.
Summary of Hypotheses
The hypotheses explored here can be broken down into 
four categories: knowledge-performance relationships 
(Hypothesis 1), training methodology (Hypotheses 2 and 3), 
attitude change (Hypotheses 4 and 5), and attitude effects 
on learning (Hypothesis 6). Below I provide a brief
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summary of the results from the six hypotheses. A more 
detailed discussion of the findings is presented in the 
sections that follow.
Relations between declarative and procedural 
knowledge and performance were found to be highly 
significant and in support of Hypotheses la and lb. 
Further, procedural knowledge was more predictive of 
performance than declarative knowledge in support of 
Hypothesis lc. The first hypotheses also predicted a 
moderate effect size for the relationship between 
declarative knowledge and performance (la) and a strong 
effect size for the relationship between procedural 
knowledge and performance (lb). Contrary to my 
hypothesis, the declarative knowledge to performance 
relationship was strong in effect size rather than 
moderate. On the other hand, the procedural knowledge to 
performance relationship did have a large effect size 
thereby fully supporting Hypothesis lb. Hypothesis lc was 
supported by evidence that the relationship between 
procedural knowledge and performance was incrementally 
greater than the relationship between declarative 
knowledge and performance. In a regression framework, 
procedural knowledge contributed incremental variance to 
performance over declarative knowledge using both 
performance accuracy and performance efficiency. 
Declarative knowledge was only incrementally predictive
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over procedural knowledge when accuracy was the dependent 
measure. The regression results therefore indicated 
somewhat weaker support for Hypothesis lc.
The second and third hypotheses examined the effects 
of modeling training and lecture training on trainee 
declarative and procedural knowledge. Hypotheses 2a and 
3a predicted that behavior modeling training would yield 
increases in declarative and procedural knowledge, 
respectively, and were both supported. Hypotheses 2b 
predicted that lecture training would produce increases in 
declarative knowledge. This hypothesis was not supported. 
In support of Hypothesis 3b, lecture trainees had greater 
procedural knowledge when measured by performance.
However, the gains in procedural knowledge using the 
procedural knowledge test were not found thereby failing 
to support Hypothesis 3b with this measure. Hypothesis 3c 
compared all modeling trainees to trainees who received a 
lecture on procedural knowledge. Results indicated that 
modeling improved procedural knowledge over lecture.
The fourth hypothesis in the study looked at whether 
the training program as a whole changed trainee attitudes 
toward computers. I expected trainees to have stronger 
beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool (4a) and 
weaker beliefs in the computer as an autonomous entity 
(4b) at post-test. Results indicated that, across all 
trainees, beneficial tool beliefs did not increase;
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Hypothesis 4a was not supported. However, autonomous 
entity attitudes decreased over time in support of 
Hypothesis 4b.
The fifth hypothesis expected changes in the two 
measured attitudes to be greater for individuals who 
received behavior modeling training. The analysis 
indicated that modeling trainees did not have stronger 
beneficial tool beliefs, hence Hypothesis 5a was not 
supported. The examination of autonomous entity beliefs 
was surprising. Modeling did not change autonomous entity 
beliefs over time any more so than no modeling. Lecture 
training also showed no change in attitudes over time. 
However, trainees who did not receive a lecture did show 
decreases in autonomous entity attitudes. Further, the 
three-way interaction between modeling, training, and time 
was narrowly non-significant (|> = .053) . Results from a 
post-hoc test comparison indicated that individuals in the 
modeling only training condition had decreases in 
autonomous entity beliefs that were greater than any of 
the other training conditions. Therefore, Hypothesis 5b 
was not supported, but the follow-up analysis suggests 
that modeling, when presented alone, may reduce trainee 
autonomous entity beliefs.
The final hypothesis in the study looked at the 
predictive validity of beneficial tool and autonomous 
entity beliefs in terms of knowledge acquisition. I
expected that trainees with high beneficial tool beliefs 
(6a) and low autonomous entity attitudes (6b) would have 
greater knowledge acquisition. Further, I expected that 
the two attitudes would interact in their prediction of 
computer knowledge acquisition (6c). Each of the 
hypotheses were tested using three dependent measures 
(declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and 
performance). Across all three measures, pre-test 
beneficial tool attitudes did not predict knowledge 
acquisition thereby failing to support Hypothesis 6a. 
Support for Hypothesis 6b was found across all three 
measures; pre-test autonomous entity beliefs were 
negatively related to computer knowledge acquisition. 
Support for the last hypothesis (6c) was only evident 
using performance accuracy as the dependent measure. 
However, the fact that the pattern of the interaction was 
consistent with what I hypothesized is encouraging. A 
significant negative relationship between autonomous 
entity attitudes and performance accuracy was found when 
beneficial tool beliefs were high whereas the relationship 
between autonomous entity attitudes and performance was 
not significant when beneficial tool attitudes were low.
A summary of the hypotheses indicates that, as a 
whole, the results were favorable. Support for the first 
hypothesis suggests that the relations between knowledge 
and performance are consistent with my expectations.
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Relations between training methodology and knowledge 
acquisition discussed in the second and third hypothesis 
indicated that modeling was a much more effective 
technique than lecturing. The fourth and fifth 
hypotheses, which examined the effects of training 
methodology on computer attitude change, were also a 
surprise. Although the results were mixed, they present 
some interesting suggestions concerning the dynamics of 
trainee interactions with technology. The portions of the 
final hypothesis that were supported have clear 
implications for researchers interested in the impact of 
trainee attitudes on knowledge acquisition.
Each of the four major sections of the results are 
discussed in detail below. Relations between knowledge 
and performance are presented first. With this framework 
in place, I discuss the impact of training methodology on 
computer knowledge. This section ties the knowledge based 
research of cognitive learning theory with the methodology 
based research drawn from social learning theory. In the 
final two sections of the discussion, I address the role 
of attitudes toward computers in training both in terms of 
what can be done to change attitudes as well as how 
attitudes can affect training outcomes. 
Knowledae-Performance Relations
Of great interest to me in formulating the hypotheses 
which center around the acquisition of computer knowledge
was how different aspects of knowledge were represented. 
The use of computers as a context for this research brings 
with it some implications not typically found in the 
acquisition of other skills. First, computer use requires 
an expansive database of facts (declarative knowledge) to 
supplement one's knowledge of how to perform tasks on the 
computer (procedural knowledge). This differs from other 
areas where the facts about a task are outnumbered by the 
procedural knowledge required to do the task (e.g., 
problem solving). Second, procedures used in the 
execution of tasks on the computer have a more salient 
property to them. Whereas procedural knowledge is 
typically characterized as difficult to describe, computer 
procedural knowledge appears to be more explicit. 
Therefore, both declarative and procedural knowledge 
appear to possess some qualities in the computer context 
that make them different from applications in other areas.
The fact that procedural knowledge was strongly 
related to performance (r = .84) is not surprising given 
that the two tests were conceptualized as being measures 
of the same construct. The strong relationship is 
encouraging when one considers the differences in 
measurement methodology between the two. The procedural 
knowledge test used a free response paper and pencil test 
that measured trainee's explicit procedural knowledge 
(i.e., "How do you do this task?"). In contrast, the
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performance test entailed tasks presented and scored on an 
actual computer. Thus the measures are virtual opposite 
ends on a continuum of explicit to implicit.
A further distinction between the two measures of the 
procedural knowledge construct concerns the opportunity 
for feedback. Feedback was non-existent in the procedural 
knowledge test and immediately accessible in the 
performance test (i.e., subjects could look at what they 
had done immediately following the execution of a task or 
command). The strong correspondence between the two 
measures suggests that feedback seeking behavior may have 
been initiated in a pattern congruent with the level of 
trainee knowledge. That is, individuals with more 
knowledge were more apt to check their work when given the 
opportunity.
The strong relationship between the procedural 
knowledge and performance tests is encouraging to the 
extent that it suggests that, congruent with my 
expectations, knowledge of how tasks on a computer are 
performed is relatively explicit. The explicit procedural 
knowledge test correlated highly with the implicit 
performance test. I also expected facts about computer 
operations (declarative knowledge) to play a much stronger 
role in this context. The strong relationship between 
declarative knowledge and performance (r = .77) supports 
this expectation as well.
I was initially surprised that declarative knowledge 
was so strongly related to performance (I hypothesized the 
effect size to be moderate). However, the fact that the 
two measures of knowledge are so process dependent may 
help to alleviate some of the confusion. Individuals 
cannot have procedural knowledge without having 
declarative knowledge first. Thus, some degree of 
correlation must exist between the two constructs.
Although not directly hypothesized, the high relationship 
between declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge (r 
= .79) supports the convergent validity of procedural 
knowledge by means of external parallelism. That is, the 
fact that the declarative knowledge test predicts the 
procedural knowledge test about as well as it predicts the 
performance test supports the idea that the two measures 
of procedural knowledge are parallel (convergent).
The discriminant validity of the tests of declarative 
and procedural knowledge is a somewhat more confusing 
issue. Direct comparison of the correlations between the 
three measures (declarative knowledge, procedural 
knowledge, and performance) indicates that procedural 
knowledge has a significantly greater relationship to 
performance than does declarative knowledge (t230 = 3. 1, p 
< .01). Thus one might expect that the two are different. 
However, I note that findings using third variables (e.g., 
training methodology) were uniform across the two measures
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of knowledge. Thus, any affects observed on the 
declarative knowledge test were similarly observed on the 
procedural knowledge test. Again invoking the concept of 
external parallelism, this would seem to argue for the 
convergent rather than discriminant validity of the 
declarative and procedural knowledge tests.
The analyses of the hypothesis positing that the 
procedural knowledge test would be more predictive of 
performance than the declarative knowledge test were 
somewhat mixed. Using performance speed (operationalized 
as time per accuracy point scored) as the dependent 
variable, neither declarative knowledge nor procedural 
knowledge were incrementally predictive over the other. 
Both types of knowledge were equally effective in 
predicting how quickly trainees performed the task. The 
other measures of performance, accuracy and efficiency 
(operationalized as number of commands per accuracy point 
scored), were consistent with my expectations. In both 
instances, procedural knowledge contributed significant 
incremental variance to the prediction of performance over 
declarative knowledge. Further, in the case of 
efficiency, declarative knowledge added nothing over 
procedural knowledge in its prediction of performance. 
Anderson (1982) suggests that the proceduralization of 
skill intones an increase in efficiency. Therefore, the 
results are consistent with the cognitive learning
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perspective: procedural knowledge related to efficiency 
above and beyond declarative knowledge. Taken together, 
the results are mixed concerning the discriminant validity 
of the declarative and procedural knowledge tests.
One of the more likely explanations for why 
discriminant validity was not clearly evident may relate 
to the task used in the study. A hallmark of the 
declarative-procedural knowledge distinction is the 
mapping of the two constructs onto an explicit 
(declarative) to implicit (procedural) continuum. 
Typically, the nature of the tasks used to demonstrate the 
distinction between the two types of knowledge (e.g., 
bicycle riding, geometry proofs) makes clear the 
differences between the two in terms of how explicit (or 
implicit) they are (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Gray & Orasunu, 
1987; Best, 1989).
As mentioned at the onset of this section, computer 
use is markedly different from these other types of tasks. 
The two main distinctions I put forth that make computer 
use different from other tasks are that: 1) operating 
computers requires much more declarative knowledge, and 2) 
procedural knowledge of computers is much more explicit. 
These two differences may have acted to blur the lines 
marking declarative and procedural knowledge to the extent 
that a clear picture of how they differ may be difficult. 
If successful operation of computers (procedural
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knowledge) requires large amounts of declarative 
knowledge, then the two will necessarily be highly related 
and any distinctions between the two will therefore be 
difficult to detect. Furthermore, the idea that 
procedural knowledge of computers is more explicit than is 
typical of other tasks (e.g., playing golf) makes the 
distinction between it and the already explicit 
declarative knowledge more difficult. The topic of what 
types of knowledge are being addressed in different 
instances will be taken up again in the sections that 
follow.
Training Methodology
Throughout the present effort, I have spoken of an 
integration of two major learning theories: cognitive 
learning theory and social learning theory. My analysis 
of knowledge changes as a function of training methodology 
addresses this goal most directly. In short, the thesis 
of this integration is that the processes by which 
individuals acquire procedural knowledge are similar to 
the processes detailed in the methods of behavior modeling 
training. Conversely, the types of knowledge acquired 
from behavior modeling training have been shown to be 
similar in description to procedural knowledge. Thus, my 
goal was to provide some evidence for this association 
between the two theories.
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One finding that is clear from the results is that 
modeling training works. Regardless of which measure was 
used (declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, or 
performance), trainees who received modeling had higher 
levels of knowledge and performance than trainees who did 
not receive modeling. This finding alone is made more 
interesting by the way in which the modeling training was 
implemented in this study. Past research has tended 
toward defining modeling training as a total package which 
includes lecture and practice (e.g., Gist et al., 1988; 
1989). In such research, modeling trainees are compared 
to trainees receiving everything but modeling. The 
primary implication discussed in these past studies has 
been that modeling's effectiveness over lecture methods is 
evident. The oversight in past research lies in the 
inclusion of lecture training as a seemingly necessary 
component to behavior modeling training as a whole. The 
independent manipulation of lecture and modeling 
components in my study represents the first instance in 
which the effectiveness of modeling may be directly 
compared to the effectiveness of the lecture method. The 
significant findings for the modeling component suggest 
that providing trainees with a lecture prior to modeling 
is not necessary for the acquisition of knowledge.
Related to this insight is the surprising finding 
that lecture training prior to task practice did not
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improve trainee knowledge over simply receiving practice. 
One would expect that being told facts about computers 
through the lecture would at the very least improve 
trainee declarative knowledge, but this was not the case. 
One logical explanation for this result might be that the 
method of presentation (i.e., a videotaped lecture) is an 
inferior technique for presenting declarative knowledge. 
This would argue against the evidence put forth by Decker 
(1983) asserting the effectiveness of videotaped 
presentations.
An alternative explanation may be that the task 
practice was so instructive that it masked any lecture 
effects that were present. To explore this further, I 
conducted a supplementary analysis the results of which 
appear in Table 17. This analysis examined relations 
between the conditions and the practice data. The intent 
was to determine if trainees who heard a lecture made 
fewer errors in practice and/or took less time to complete 
the practice session than trainees who did not hear a 
lecture.
Error data (measured as the total number of retries 
across the 50-task practice session, and maintained by the 
computer) was the dependent measure in a 2 (modeling 
versus no modeling) X 2 (lecture versus no lecture) ANOVA. 
Both the modeling and lecture main effects were
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significant (see Table 17). Analysis of the means 
revealed that modeling trainees (M = 79.7) made fewer 
errors than non-modeling trainees (M = 97.7), and lecture 
trainees (M = 85.5) made fewer errors than non-lecture
trainees (M = 91.2). To further analyze the practice
data, I also examined practice time. Using the same 
design, I again found both main effects to be significant. 
Modeling trainees (M = 35.2) were faster than non-modeling 
trainees (M = 42.8), and lecture trainees (M = 37.6) were
faster than non-lecture trainees (M = 40.0).
The results from the analysis of the practice data 
appear to support the idea that lecturing was effective. 
That is, lecture trainees took less time and made fewer 
errors while practicing. Conversely, and of greater 
interest, trainees who did not receive a lecture spent 
more time practicing. The implication of this observation 
is that the extra practice time devoted by the no lecture 
trainees may have been sufficient to equate the two groups 
on knowledge.
Further evidence to support this contention comes 
from results obtained in the pilot study (see p. 71). 
Recall that in pilot testing the knowledge measures, 53 of 
the 135 subjects I pre-tested received an earlier version 
of the key learning points lecture one week after the 
initial knowledge test administration. Subsequent to the 
lecture, these trainees were post-tested on declarative
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Table 17
Modeling bv Lecture ANOVAs for Practice Errors and
Practice Time
Effect df MS F
Deoendent Variable = Practice Errors
Modeling (M) 1 20430.9 52.0**
Lecture (L) 1 2593.3 6.6*
M X L 1 381.6 1.0
Error 249 409.5
Dependent Variable = Practice Time
Modeling (M) 1 3700.3 35.4**
Lecture (L) 1 455.5 4.4*
M X L 1 2.6 .9
Error 249 104.6
Note: * = p < .05. ** = P < .01.
and procedural knowledge. Results from the pilot study 
indicated that individuals receiving the lecture had 
significant gains in declarative knowledge (pre-test M = 
20.4, post-test M = 51.2; t36 = 11.3, p < .01) and 
procedural knowledge (pre-test M = 10.2, post-test M = 
34.3; t36 = 7.9, p < .01). Comparing subjects who 
received pre-test knowledge tests with subjects who did
not on post-test knowledge revealed a non-significant 
result (declarative knowledge: t30 4 = 0. 1, ns; procedural 
knowledge: t35 3 = 0.3, ns) indicating that no test 
practice effects occurred. Further, I examined the 
possibility of subject self-selection (i.e., were lecture 
subjects choosing to go to the lecture because of their 
higher computer knowledge) by comparing subjects who post­
tested and subjects who did not on pre-test knowledge. 
Results indicated that this was not the case (declarative 
knowledge: t̂ 9 4 = 1.7, ns; procedural knowledge: t̂ 5 6 =
2.0, ns). This evidence drawn from the pilot study 
suggests that the lecture method is effective in improving 
knowledge when practice is not given. The results are 
also congruent with the notion that practice may have made 
up for any decrement no lecture trainees experienced 
thereby resulting in no lecture effects. However, I 
should note that the key learning points lecture given in 
the pilot study was performed "live." Therefore, the 
possibility that subjects failed to respond to the lecture 
because of the medium (videotaped instruction) remains.
As a method for instructing individuals on how to 
perform tasks, this study suggests that the lecture was 
not successful at improving knowledge over practice alone. 
However, when I examined training method differences using 
performance as the dependent measure, lecture trainees 
were found to have higher performance accuracy than no
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lecture trainees. Evidently, trainees did acquire 
information from the lecture that enabled them to perform 
more accurately, but at the same time they were unable to 
represent that information on either the declarative or 
procedural knowledge tests.
One possible explanation that exists for these 
findings is that the information acquired in lecture was 
somehow encoded by the trainees in a manner more implicit 
than expected. That is, the lecture imparts declarative 
knowledge which tends to be explicit in nature, but the 
pattern of results here suggests that the explicit 
knowledge tests were ineffective in bringing out the 
declarative knowledge-based lecture differences. In 
contrast, lecture training did have an impact on the 
implicit test of knowledge (i.e., performance). The 
practice data presented in Table 17 may shed some light on 
this issue since, like performance, they too are implicit 
in nature. Recall that both ANOVAs produced results 
identical to that which was found for performance 
accuracy; modeling and lecture trainees made fewer 
practice errors and required less practice time. An added 
advantage of the practice data concerns the possibility of 
evaluation apprehension. Trainees were told prior to the 
commencement of the performance test that their 
performance would be monitored. Conversely, prior to the 
practice session, no indication was given that their
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performance was being monitored. Rather, trainees were 
encouraged to take their time and attempt to understand 
where their errors had occurred. Therefore, the analyses 
help to rule out the possibility that the performance data 
was spurious.
The analyses are encouraging to the extent that they 
support the viability of the lecture method although not 
for knowledge per se. Lecture training with practice 
appears to be superior to simply practicing on the 
performance-based implicit aspects of computer knowledge 
(i.e., practice and performance accuracy), but does not 
appear to be superior on explicit measures of computer 
knowledge. The results should not be construed as an 
indication that lecture is ineffective as a means of 
transferring knowledge. Rather, the lecture simply did 
not improve trainee knowledge over merely practicing.
I also note that the results presented here should 
not detract from the fact that behavior modeling is a 
superior training methodology. In six of seven analyses 
conducted on the training methods (declarative knowledge, 
procedural knowledge, performance accuracy, performance 
speed, practice errors, and practice time), modeling 
effects were significant and corresponding effect sizes 
were larger than those obtained from the lecture factor.
In contrast, lecture effects were significant in only 3 of 
the seven analyses conducted (performance accuracy,
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practice errors, and practice time). Further, the a 
priori contrast analysis which compared modeling to 
lecture indicates that, regardless of whether modeling was 
supplemented by lecture or not, modeling is superior to 
lecture.
To summarize the hypotheses focusing on the effects 
of training methodology, I found that modeling training 
improves declarative and procedural knowledge. Lecture 
training did not increase trainee declarative knowledge 
over practice alone. When procedural knowledge was 
measured explicitly (i.e., via a test) lecture training 
did not increase procedural knowledge. However, implicit 
measures of procedural knowledge (performance and 
practice) indicated that lecture training was effective in 
increasing trainee knowledge.
Before moving to the next section, I must comment on 
the counter-intuitive finding that lecture improved 
implicit measures (performance accuracy and practice) but 
not explicit measures (the procedural knowledge test).
The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is that 
the benefit of lecture training was not realized until 
application of that knowledge to an actual situation was 
required. The post-test knowledge measures, by their 
nature, may not have provided sufficient context for the 
activation of the knowledge acquired in the lecture.
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Since the key learning points lecture was heavily laden 
with examples and applications (see Appendix A), lecture 
trainees may have relied on this when working on the 
computer as a cue to tap their knowledge. Therefore, 
failure to show superior knowledge over no lecture 
trainees may simply be an artifact of the test type (paper 
and pencil versus performance).
Training Effects on Computer Attitudes
The inclusion of computer attitudes in my research 
marks a departure from previous training research which 
has examined attitudes toward training as opposed to 
content-based attitudes (Goldstein, 1993). Further, 
little research on computer attitude change over time has 
been conducted. As such, no indication of the 
malleability of computer attitudes over time or from 
training interventions has been suggested. A further 
demarcation point in the use of attitudes in training 
paradigms concerns the implications the two types of 
attitudes toward computers (beneficial tool beliefs and 
autonomous entity beliefs) have for training outcomes. 
Because the attitudes focus on the content of the training 
rather than the training pedagogy itself, some indication 
of the strength of the attitudes for improving knowledge 
is both warranted and of interest to researchers 
attempting to design future computer training systems. In 
the section that follows, I examine the results from my
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research which address the issues of computer attitude 
change and attitude effects on learning.
An overview of the attitude change hypotheses reveals 
that the results were very different for the two types of 
attitudes. That is, the effects of training on trainee 
changes in their beliefs in the computer as a beneficial 
tool were quite different from the changes observed in 
trainee autonomous entity beliefs. Across all groups, 
beneficial tool beliefs did not increase as a result of 
the training program. In contrast, beliefs that the 
computer is an autonomous entity decreased from pre-test 
to post-test.
Some light can be shed on these findings if one 
considers the theoretical model put forth by Brock and 
Sulsky (in press). In this research, we tested a 
hypothesis put forth by Rafaeli (1986) that beliefs in the 
computer as an autonomous entity were a result of 
unfamiliarity with computers whereas beliefs in the 
computer as a beneficial tool were a result of experience 
with the technology. Our results supported the idea that 
autonomous entity beliefs preceded computer use whereas 
beneficial tool beliefs were a result of computer use. In 
the context of this research, the three hour training 
session gave trainees sufficient exposure to allay their 
fears and anxieties about computers (autonomous entity 
beliefs), but did not provide enough experience with the
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machine for trainees to form beliefs in the computer as a 
beneficial tool. I would expect that, if exposure to the 
computer continued, trainees would begin to formulate more 
beneficial tool beliefs as they consequently became aware 
of the utility of computers.
The finding that modeling training did not improve 
trainee computer attitudes is also congruent with Brock 
and Sulsky's (in press) model. Since modeling training 
does not necessarily guarantee more exposure to computers, 
the increase in beneficial tool beliefs should not be that 
great. In contrast, my results found that lecture 
training significantly increased trainee beneficial tool 
beliefs. Although I did not hypothesize this to be the 
case, a consideration of this phenomenon within the model 
presented above also helps to explicate the finding. The 
lecture process can be seen as an hour-long sales pitch 
for the utility of computers. Rather than explaining how 
commands on the computer worked (as in the modeling 
training), the lecture told trainees what could be done 
with computers. Therefore, trainees were informed as to 
how the computer was a beneficial tool.
By the same processes that essentially "sold” 
trainees on the idea that computer are beneficial tools 
(i.e., the key learning points lecture), a very different 
result occurred for trainee autonomous entity beliefs. 
Recall that, across all groups, the training session
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reduced trainee autonomous entity beliefs. The main 
effect for time, however, is qualified by a significant 
interaction between lecture training and time. Analysis 
of the simple effects revealed that trainees who did not 
receive a lecture had decreases in autonomous entity 
beliefs whereas lecture trainees remained unchanged.
Thus, the same method that evidently "sold" trainees on 
the idea that computers were beneficial tools may have 
inadvertently scared some trainees away.
Since the assertion that a lack of something (in this 
case lecture training) can cause changes in attitudes 
seems somewhat dubious, I explored this finding further. 
Figure 3 graphically depicts the pre- and post-test 
autonomous entity means for the four training conditions. 
Several observations concerning the graph are noteworthy. 
First, the modeling plus lecture group appears to differ 
from the other training conditions in that the slope of 
the line from pre-test to post-test is nearly flat. 
Conversely, all other groups showed a downward trend.
Thus, when collapsed together, a main effect for time is 
evident. Second, the odd behavior of the modeling plus 
lecture training condition appears to have contributed to 
the interaction between time and lecture. Collapsing 
across the two lecture groups reveals that the slope of 
the line from pre-test to post-test is approximately flat. 
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Time by Training Condition Cell Means for Autonomous 
Entity Beliefs
autonomous entity beliefs from pre-test to post-test.
This observation is congruent with the simple effects 
tests which indicated that only the pre-post effect for 
the no lecture groups was significant. A third and final 
observation concerns the large decrease in autonomous 
entity beliefs which occurred in the modeling only group. 
Consistent with a visual inspection of Figure 3, post-hoc
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Scheffe tests revealed that modeling only trainees had 
significantly greater decreases in autonomous entity 
beliefs than any of the other three training conditions.
Two comments are in order concerning the 
interpretation of these findings. First, I speculate that 
the general trend indicating a decrease in trainee 
autonomous entity beliefs was moderated by the lecture 
rather than a lack thereof. As I suggested above, the 
lecture training my have inadvertently intimidated 
trainees by presenting a large amount of information in a 
short period of time. Congruent with this expectation, 
trainees who merely received modeling had the greatest 
decreases in autonomous entity beliefs. The fact that the 
modeling plus lecture and lecture only groups showed no 
change in autonomous entity beliefs also supports this 
contention. Concerning the modeling plus lecture group, 
the combination of lecture (which may have intimidated 
trainees thereby increasing autonomous entity beliefs) and 
modeling (which eased trainee fears thereby decreasing 
autonomous entity beliefs) may have resulted in a 
canceling out of effects. Hence no change occurred from 
pre-test to post-test.
A second comment regarding my interpretation concerns 
the fact that my post-hoc examination of differences 
between the four training groups was not based on a 
significant interaction. Although the analysis used was
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the most conservative of estimates among post-hoc 
procedures, and the obtained three-way interaction was 
narrowly non-significant, the reader may wish to interpret 
these results with caution.
Attitude Effects on Computer Training
The final analyses in the study moved from examining 
attitude change toward examining the effects of trainee 
attitudes on computer knowledge acquisition. As I alluded 
to previously, attitudes toward training have typically 
been unsuccessful in predicting learning (Goldstein,
1993) . However, the attitudes measured in this study 
relate directly to the content of the training. This 
appears to be a likely explanation for the findings 
indicating that attitudes do, in fact, predict trainee 
knowledge change. Also of interest is the observation 
that, across all forms of knowledge measurement 
(declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge measured 
explicitly by test and implicitly through performance), 
the results were consistent. Autonomous entity attitudes 
significantly predicted computer knowledge acquisition 
whereas beneficial tool beliefs did not.
These results also tie in nicely with the Brock and 
Sulsky (in press) model. Given that the level of 
experience with computers among the trainees was 
relatively low (M = 1.9 years of exposure to computers), 
it is not surprising that autonomous entity attitudes
would be prevalent. If, as Brock and Sulsky (in press) 
suggest, autonomous entity attitudes precede computer use 
and beneficial tool beliefs form following the use of 
computers, then inexperienced trainees are likely to be 
undifferentiated on beneficial tool beliefs prior to 
coming in contact with the machines. As such, beneficial 
tool beliefs would lack the predictive validity for 
identifying changes in knowledge as a result of a training 
intervention. This appears to be the most likely 
explanation for the findings in this study. Trainees high 
in autonomous entity beliefs learned less than trainees 
low in autonomous entity beliefs. Conversely, beliefs 
that the computer is a beneficial tool theoretically form 
from continuous exposure to and work with computers. If 
this is the case, pre-intervention assessment of 
beneficial tool beliefs would not be predictive of changes 
in knowledge because trainees did not have the exposure to 
computers necessary for the formation of those beliefs. 
Again, the findings in this study appear to support this 
explanation.
It is interesting to note that the analysis of the 
final sub-hypothesis examining knowledge acquisition as a 
result of prior attitudes toward computers followed a 
pattern similar to that which was observed in reporting 
the previous results; different results occurred when 
performance accuracy was used as the dependent measure.
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Results for the declarative and procedural knowledge tests 
were consistent in indicating that the two attitudes did 
not interact in their prediction of knowledge acquisition. 
However, an interaction was found when performance was 
used as the dependent measure.
Although the obtained interaction was consistent with 
my hypothesis (beneficial tool beliefs moderated 
autonomous entity beliefs such that the beliefs only 
impacted learning when beneficial tool attitudes were 
high), the results should be interpreted with caution. 
Since there was no pre-test measure of performance, there 
was no way to control for prior ability with computers. 
Based on the strong relationship between procedural 
knowledge and performance, one alternative would be to 
assume that pre-test performance was at a level similar to 
the level of pre-test procedural knowledge. Following 
this assumption, I conducted an exploratory analysis using 
performance accuracy as the dependent measure and pre-test 
procedural knowledge as a covariate. Attitudes were 
entered in the second step followed by the interaction 
term. The interaction of the two attitudes on computer 
performance (controlling for procedural knowledge) was 
found to be non-significant (6 = -.01, t228 = -1.3 , ns) . 
This analysis suggests the possibility that the 
significant interaction between computer attitudes and 
computer performance may have been due to a priori
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performance differences that were related to computer 
attitudes.
A final explanation for why attitudes did not 
interact in their effect on knowledge also concerns the 
dependent measures examined. Previous evidence for the 
finding of an attitude interaction was obtained using 
computer use as the dependent measure (Brock, 1993).
Since using the computer and knowing how computers work 
are two different things, it may be that the two dependent 
variables are more different than they are alike. If this 
is the case then attitudes may interact to determine 
whether an individual uses computers but not to determine 
how much they learn about computers.
This summary of the findings of interest in the study 
suggests numerous implications for future research in the 
social and cognitive learning realms. Further, the 
study's basis in training coupled with the focus on 
computers and technology has ramifications for 
practitioners interested in improving employee interaction 
with technology. Below I present these ramifications in 
an attempt to broaden the scope of this research. 
Implications. Limitations. and Future Research
At the onset of this research, I stated two main 
objectives which I intended to explore. The first 
objective was to contribute to the psychological research 
on technology in an effort to narrow the gap between the
140
rapid expanse of technology in the workplace and our 
understanding of that technology. This is perhaps the 
most applicable area of my research in that my results 
relate directly to the field of technology. The two 
foremost areas in which I saw a need for further 
exploration were training in technology and attitudes 
toward that technology. In essence, I examined how 
individuals react to technology and, at the same time, how 
they adapt to and learn about that technology.
The second objective in my research was to examine 
how readily components of two popular learning theories 
(cognitive and social learning theory) could be integrated 
in a single design. This aspect of my research sought to 
examine the effectiveness of behavior modeling training in 
explicating the declarative/procedural knowledge 
distinction, and how well the two knowledge constructs 
aided in the explanation of the phenomenon of modeling.
My research explored behavior modeling training from 
social learning theory, and the declarative-procedural 
knowledge distinction from cognitive learning theory.
I also explored specific issues within each of the 
theories that are worthy of note here. For behavior 
modeling training, I examined the interplay between 
lecture and modeling in an effort to determine what 
aspects of the training methodology as a whole were most 
effective. In examining declarative and procedural
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knowledge, I sought to determine: 1) how the two concepts 
could be operationalized within the context of computers, 
and 2) how well procedural knowledge could be explicated 
through the use of measures other than performance (viz., 
a paper and pencil test). Finally, since these components 
of the two theories were examined in the same study, I was 
able to address the feasibility of an integration of the 
two theories.
In the sections that follow, I bring out the 
implications of my research for these two major objectives 
(technology research and the learning theory integration). 
When appropriate, suggestions for future research are 
provided. Discussion of the limitations in the research 
are interwoven within the dialogue at appropriate points.
Technology Training. The primary implications for 
future research in the area of technology which may be 
drawn from my research center around training and 
attitudes. Concerning training, my research supports that 
of Gist and her colleagues (1988; 1989) in suggesting that 
the best way to learn about computers is to watch someone 
else execute the tasks first. The finding that modeling 
was effective in improving learning over practice alone is 
not surprising. In my personal experience working with 
individuals on computers, I find that the skills needed to 
perform tasks on the computer are much easier shown than 
they are told.
Future research which explores the various components 
of technology training will, I believe, discover that the 
nature of the topic is what drives the success of 
modeling. That is, technological manifestations such as 
computers have certain characteristics that readily lend 
themselves to modeling. Procedures for performing 
operations on the computer (e.g., copying a file) are 
unlikely to change from computer to computer thereby 
making the acquired knowledge widely applicable and 
relatively stable. Further, computer operation relies 
heavily on the visual medium. The interaction between 
human and machine takes place on a monitor where all 
feedback from the computer occurs. As such, methods like 
modeling are ideal for teaching individuals how to use 
computers since they offer so much information on how to 
interact with the computer and what to expect from the 
computer in different instances.
This research possesses numerous avenues and 
implications for organizations interested in technology 
training. Foremost, individuals interested in the design 
of training seminars can be assured that methods which use 
a model who demonstrates the desired behavior are an 
effective means of transferring training content. 
Additionally, my research suggests that videotaped 
presentation of the model is an effective means of 
transferring the information to trainees. This suggests
that organizations can save time and resources normally 
dedicated to live seminars in deference to a prepared 
videotape. A final organizational implication concerns 
the need for future research into the training content 
being modeled. My intervention utilized a widely 
applicable, but not so user-friendly, software package 
(i.e., DOS). Care should be taken to note how different 
types of software may be more or less amenable to the 
modeling process. Specifically, more technical software 
(e.g., drafting programs, statistical packages) may 
require a greater emphasis on content before the execution 
of a modeling intervention. Additionally, more computer­
intensive programs may require more input from the model. 
In my study, the model was simply a guide who showed 
trainees what the various commands looked like on the 
computer. Another implication then, is that software with 
an extensive degree of computer involvement may require 
more of a "human supplement" in the modeling process.
Attitudes Toward Technology. The second aspect of my 
research related to technology concerned the ways trainees 
react to computers. Several implications lie in the 
results obtained from the attitudinal findings. In 
general, the notion that trainees hold two distinct 
attitudes toward computers put forth by Brock and Sulsky 
(in press) was supported in this research. Beliefs in the 
computer as a beneficial tool and beliefs in the computer
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as an autonomous entity had different implications for 
trainees. For example, I found that lecture training 
improved beneficial tool attitudes but did not change 
autonomous entity attitudes.
The idea that different types of training can hold 
different implications for attitudes deserves further 
mention. The pattern of results which appeared in my 
research suggested that lecture training improved 
beneficial tool attitudes but was not generally successful 
at improving learning. Thus, beliefs in the computer as a 
beneficial tool appear to be a result of trainees being 
"sold" on the idea that computers are useful. Further, 
beneficial tool beliefs were not found to be predictive of 
knowledge acquisition.
In contrast, autonomous entity beliefs hold a more 
interesting set of implications. Autonomous entity 
attitudes significantly predicted knowledge acquisition 
suggesting that trainees with low levels of these 
attitudes were able to learn more. Two implications for 
future research lie in this finding. First, if my 
research is generalizable to field settings, organizations 
could use an assessment of employee attitudes toward 
computers as a means of determining which employees would 
be most successful in future technology training programs. 
Related to this, the assessment of trainee attitudes could 
also serve as a diagnostic tool to determine where
145
resistance to the introduction of new forms of technology 
may lay.
A second implication directed toward researchers in 
technology pertains to determining the best method for 
reducing negative computer attitudes. The intervention 
utilized here was successful in reducing autonomous entity 
beliefs across all conditions. Further, conditions that 
did not receive a lecture showed a significant decrease in 
autonomous entity beliefs whereas lecture trainees showed 
no change. Therefore, the lecture convinced trainees that 
computers are a beneficial tool and an autonomous entity 
(or at least the lecture aided in maintaining trainee 
autonomous entity beliefs).
The fact that modeling did not significantly reduce 
trainee autonomous entity beliefs is discouraging.
However, given that this is the first attempt made at 
identifying the best methods for reducing these attitudes, 
the interested researcher should consider the possibility 
of other interventions which may more directly temper 
trainee autonomous entity beliefs. One suggestion would 
be to design a modeling intervention that places more 
emphasis on "humanizing" the computer. My modeling 
intervention stressed the actions taken on the computer 
and down-played the human component. Future interventions 
might utilize the model in a more active role where
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trainees could infer more attitudinal information than was 
presented here.
A final suggestion for future research concerns the 
interaction of the two attitudes on knowledge acquisition. 
I have already addressed the possibility that the weak 
support for this hypothesis may have been indicative of an 
inappropriate dependent measure (i.e., attitudes may 
interact on computer use but not on knowledge ). However, 
future research could be instructive on this point if it 
were to examine the phenomenon in other training settings. 
Perhaps the lack of an interaction was in part due to the 
varying effects lecture and modeling training had on 
trainees.
The preceding pages suggest numerous avenues for 
future research in technology. I have presented a few of 
those which pertain directly to training and attitudes and 
which fall directly out of the results from my research.
I should note that the implications herein should not be 
considered exhaustive. My research focused on computer 
attitudes and training which represent two of the many 
other aspects of computers that could be addressed (e.g., 
the introduction of new technology into organizations, the 
effects of computer monitoring, ergonomic issues in human- 
computer interaction). Additionally, computers are just 
one form of technology, research that explores other areas 
(e.g., telecommunications, robotics, artificial
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intelligence) is strongly recommended. Given that the 
psychological research on technology and its effects on 
humans is in its infancy, much remains to be done in 
exploring these other aspects of technology. A third 
caveat relates to the scope of the intervention. My 
research examined the reactions and learning of trainees 
under relatively individualized conditions. Other 
research might focus more at the group or systems level 
when examining technology and its impact on workers.
Social Learning Theory. The aspect of my research on 
behavior modeling training which sets it apart from 
previous examinations concerns the partialling out of the 
lecture and modeling components of the methodology. In so 
doing, I was able to determine that modeling alone was 
just as effective as having modeling supp1emented by 
lecture. This finding adds to the extant literature on 
the effectiveness of modeling for computer training by 
showing that the lecture component is not as critical to 
the modeling process as was once thought (e.g., Gist et 
al., 1988; 1989).
I see two main implications of the finding that 
modeling does not require a lecture component. First, 
future research on behavior modeling training may be more 
parsimonious in design. That is, modeling interventions 
may not need to include a "tell" component in the "tell 
and show" package. In many instances, especially in
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practical settings, this "trimming" of the training 
methodology could result in shorter training programs 
(which are therefore more cost effective) or could allow 
for more time to be spent in other aspects of the 
methodology (e.g., extended task practice, more elaborate 
modeling).
A second implication pertains to the generalizability 
of the finding to other research domains. As I have noted 
on numerous occasions, there are specific aspects of the 
training content (computers) that may make results from 
the research different from those found in other training 
settings. It may be the case that the learning process 
relies so heavily on interacting with the machine that 
attempts to acquire knowledge away from the computer are 
hampered in their effectiveness. Therefore, lecture 
training may be too far removed from the "hands-on" 
training that is so valuable for computer knowledge 
acquisition. Future research should examine modeling only 
training in other domains to see if the results obtained 
here generalize.
Related to the observation that behavior modeling 
training does not necessarily require the inclusion of a 
lecture sub-component, the nature of the training design 
(i.e., a two by two crossed design) allowed for several 
unintended discoveries. Specifically, a comparison of the 
modeling plus lecture and modeling only groups provides
some interesting insights into the dynamics operating in 
the modeling process. Individuals in the modeling only 
training condition had greatly reduced autonomous entity 
beliefs from pre-test to post-test (see Figure 3). In 
contrast, individuals with both modeling and lecture 
showed no change in their beliefs in the computer as an 
autonomous entity. The modeling only condition may be 
construed as a more pure form of how behavior modeling 
training was originally conceptualized. That is, trainees 
in this condition are simply shown how the tasks are 
performed and then given an opportunity to practice. 
Traditional modeling interventions have shown that the 
technique is an effective means of reducing fears and 
anxieties (Bandura, et al., 1969). Thus if we construe 
the modeling only group to be the best characterization of 
how true modeling operates, then it is not surprising to 
find that trainees in this group showed the greatest 
reduction in computer-related fears and anxieties (i.e., 
autonomous entity beliefs). Given that this finding was 
unintended, future research should examine modeling only 
training to determine if the effects on autonomous entity 
beliefs reported above are indeed robust.
If the results presented here are replicated, the 
implication is that researchers and practitioners should 
be careful to design their training interventions to fit 
the needs of their trainees. If a reduction in negative
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attitudes toward computers is desired, my research 
suggests that a straightforward modeling approach (without 
lecture) is warranted. On the other hand, drawing from 
evidence presented earlier, a lecture approach is 
warranted if the goal is to increase trainee positive 
attitudes toward computers (i.e., beneficial tool 
beliefs).
A further note is in order concerning the modeling 
plus lecture training condition. I expected trainees in 
this condition to acquire more knowledge than trainees in 
any other condition. However, the results suggest that 
these trainees performed at a level approximately 
equivalent to that of the modeling only group. I have 
suggested that the lecture intervention's failure to 
produce significant changes in trainee knowledge may have 
been a result of the quality of task practice; any 
decrement the no lecture trainees faced was compensated 
for by the practice session. This observation may also be 
extended to the findings for the modeling plus lecture 
condition. Future research could contribute to a better 
understanding of why the lecture did not aid modeling by 
examining other conditions not explored in this study. 
Specifically, the addition of several training groups 
which examined the effectiveness of the two training 
interventions (modeling and lecture) when coupled with a 
no practice condition might help to determine the
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contribution of practice to the training outcomes. Here I 
am proposing research which manipulates lecture, modeling, 
and practice in its design rather than lecture and 
modeling alone. A study such as this could, therefore, 
more directly determine whether the effectiveness of 
behavior modeling training can be improved by the addition 
of a lecture sub-component.
Cognitive Learning Theory. In utilizing the 
cognitive learning theory literature, the most significant 
contribution of my efforts lays in the means by which I 
have characterized the constructs of declarative and 
procedural knowledge. Although examinations of this 
knowledge distinction are replete in the cognitive 
literature (see Weiss, 1990) its use in industrial 
psychological training contexts has been limited to a very 
few examinations (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 
Therefore, the general contribution of this effort was 
twofold: 1) I presented a utilization of the declarative 
and procedural knowledge constructs in a more applied 
context, and 2) I operationalized the construct of 
procedural knowledge in a manner different from that 
previously conceived.
The measurement of procedural knowledge in this 
research marks a first attempt at examining an alternative 
approach to understanding the construct. The long-held 
demonstrative measure of procedural knowledge has been
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performance. I propose that performance is an imperfect 
measure of procedural knowledge because it fails to 
directly measure knowledge. Performance measures the 
outcome of procedural knowledge and is therefore measuring 
a result rather than the knowledge itself.
In developing the knowledge measures, I found my 
assessment of the declarative knowledge test to be 
entirely congruent with previous research measuring the 
construct (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 
That is, tests of what facts a subject knows about a task 
are administered by asking the subject that very question: 
"What do you know?" However, when I turned to 
examinations of procedural knowledge measurement I found 
the approach to be much less direct. Arguably, the fact 
that procedural knowledge is a more complex construct than 
declarative knowledge supports the contention that 
procedural knowledge measurement should be more involved. 
However, to my knowledge, no attempts at directly 
measuring procedural knowledge have been made. This is 
exactly what I proposed to do. I measured trainee 
procedural knowledge by asking the trainees how they would 
perform tasks on the computer.
A major limitation of my research lies in my 
inability to effectively discriminate between declarative 
and procedural knowledge. Principally, this failure lies 
in the non-significant lecture effects observed for both
declarative and procedural knowledge. Because this 
research marks the first time that procedural knowledge 
has been measured explicitly, I am unable to utilize past 
research to suggest why the study failed to show 
differential results across training conditions. My 
suspicion is that the blame for why the two knowledge 
tests could not be differentiated lies with the new method 
I used to measure procedural knowledge. Further, I 
believe that the explanation for why the procedural 
knowledge test was not distinguishable from the 
declarative knowledge is test content-based rather than 
construct-based. Nevertheless, future research should 
examine this means of measuring procedural knowledge to 
determine if the limitation lies in the study or in the 
theory. Below I discuss some implications for improving 
upon procedural knowledge assessment in future research.
The primary criticism that can be leveled at this 
method of measuring procedural knowledge is that 
procedural knowledge is typically characterized as 
difficult to describe (Best, 1989). Therefore, any 
attempt at directly measuring procedural knowledge will 
fall short in explicating the implicit components of the 
knowledge. Two arguments may be made in defense of my 
application of procedural knowledge. First, from a 
content perspective, the focal task (computers) is such 
that the aspects of knowledge which are procedural are
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also more explicit. That is, computer procedural 
knowledge is, based on my personal experience, more easy 
to describe.
A second, empirically-based, argument is that my new 
measure of procedural knowledge and the more traditional 
measure of the construct (performance) were highly 
related. This observation lends itself to numerous 
suggestions for future research. For example, the high 
relationship between the two measures suggests the 
possibility that some components of implicit knowledge are 
being addressed explicitly. Future examinations might 
address whether proceduralized knowledge has been compiled 
in a manner that is r6Xaccessible in memory (i.e.,
explicit). Still another implication of the relationship 
between the procedural knowledge test and performance 
pertains to how the two might be combined to optimize 
construct explanation. Here the methods used to achieve 
the goal could be strictly statistical (e.g., MANOVA), or 
theoretical.
Future research which examines the measurement of 
procedural knowledge might also benefit from a more 
thorough examination of the content of the items on the 
declarative and procedural knowledge tests. That is, what 
aspects of knowledge are addressed in the procedural 
knowledge test that make them different from the 
declarative knowledge test? Given that my implementation
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was narrow in scope (i.e., ten commonly used DOS 
commands), the content of the two knowledge tests had 
substantial overlap (see Appendices D and E). This 
suggests that any differences between the test must be 
real (i.e., due to the type of knowledge being tapped 
rather than the content of the items). However, it could 
also be argued that procedural knowledge items are merely 
more difficult or more involved demonstrations of 
declarative knowledge. That is, the items simply require 
the integration of several pieces of declarative knowledge 
rather than a transformation of that knowledge into a 
procedure. Future research examining these issues could 
contribute greatly to clarifying this limitation.
Still another implication along a similar line 
pertains to the overlap between items on the procedural 
knowledge test and the performance measure. Although the 
content of the items on the two measures was markedly 
similar (see Appendices E and F), future research might 
benefit from an implementation that directly addressed 
each component of a procedural knowledge test in a 
subsequent performance test. An examination such as this 
could also explore the relative effectiveness of the two 
6Xof assessment in terms of providing cues to 
subjects. There remains a possibility in my research that 
subjects who were asked to recall how tasks are performed 
in the procedural knowledge test were inadvertently
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directed toward which components of the training were more 
important for the performance test. Therefore, the order 
of presentation could be staggered in future designs to 
determine if one test aided performance on another test.
To summarize thus far, I have presented implications 
for future research in behavior modeling training and in 
examinations of the declarative-procedural knowledge 
distinction. I conclude my discussion of the study's 
implications with a dialogue on the theoretical 
integration of cognitive and social learning theory in an 
effort to address this objective of my research.
Integrating the Learning Theories. As stated above, 
a large portion of the present effort directed itself at 
the implications of an integration of cognitive and social 
learning theory. At its most basic level, the results 
from my research did not paint the clear picture I would 
have 1iked. The training interventions (modeling and 
lecture) produced similar results on the two knowledge 
variables making distinctions between the two on the basis 
of training methodology weak.
My initial explorations into the two learning 
theories brought me to two simple links which formed the 
basis of this integration. Lecture training appeared to 
be a process of transmitting declarative knowledge (i.e., 
teaching them what) whereas modeling training involved the 
process of conveying procedural knowledge (i.e., teaching
them how). Ideally then, the results of my research would 
show significant lecture effects for declarative knowledge 
but not procedural knowledge, and significant modeling 
effects for declarative and procedural knowledge (since 
declarative knowledge must precede procedural knowledge). 
Unfortunately, the pattern of results did not hold up for 
the lecture method. Lecture trainees did not acquire 
greater declarative knowledge over trainees without 
benefit of the lecture. Further, contrary to my 
predictions, lecture trainees had more knowledge than no 
lecture trainees when performance was used to assess 
procedural knowledge. On the other hand, modeling 
training did lead to an increase in both types of 
knowledge thereby affirming my expectations.
Although the results from the study suggest that my 
attempted integration of the two theories was not without 
its faults, there are components of the results which may 
hold some merit. I propose that the primary discontinuing 
finding, that lecture training did not contribute to 
declarative knowledge gains, is a result of limitations in 
my research. As I have already mentioned, the design of 
my study was such that all subjects received practice and 
this feature has been suggested as an explanation for why 
the lecture method did not improve knowledge scores. The 
quality of practice may have been so great that it washed 
out any existent lecture effects. Recall that the
acquisition of procedural knowledge occurs through 
repeated application of declarative knowledge (i.e., 
practice). Therefore, one explanation for the non­
significant lecture findings is that the no lecture 
trainees were able to infer declarative knowledge from the 
practice session thereby equating themselves with the 
lecture trainees on post-test declarative knowledge. This 
inferential knowledge acquisition may also have been 
sufficient to make differences between lecture and no 
lecture trainees nil on the procedural knowledge test. 
However, as evidenced by the significant findings for 
performance accuracy, lecture trainees did gain some 
knowledge that trainees without the benefit of the lecture 
did not.
The proposed integration of the two learning theories 
can best be summarized by considering the three stages 
each has. The first stage in cognitive learning theory 
(declarative knowledge) was theoretically likened to the 
lecture portion of behavior modeling training. The second 
stage, knowledge acquisition, is subsequently associated 
with task practice in modeling training. The procedural 
knowledge stage is the final level for trainees in 
cognitive learning theory. Its analog in social learning 
theory is the application of modeled behavior. I believe 
that the key to the success of the marriage between these 
two theories lies in clarifying the distinctions between
the three stages. I see three main limitations of my 
research in which future research could contribute to a 
clarification of the distinctions between these stages. 
First, as discussed above, the study did not measure 
trainee knowledge following the lecture. Future research 
could make use of this assessment as a means of 
eliminating the possibility that practice masked the 
effects of lecture. Second, the critical interim phase in 
knowledge acquisition (knowledge compilation) deserves 
more careful examination in future research. Subjects in 
my research received not quite one hour of practice in 
which to proceduralize their declarative knowledge. The 
implication here is that, with more practice, the 
distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge 
might become more noticeable. With more time to practice, 
subjects could begin to formulate more elaborate 
procedural knowledge. A third limitation to my research 
concerns the need for a better operationalization of the 
two knowledge measures. Specifically, the high 
relationship between declarative and procedural knowledge 
might be lowered by a clarification of the differences 
between the two types of knowledge. Clearer 
operationalization of the measures in the construct 
development phase might aid in distinguishing the two 
stages of knowledge acquisition from each other. 
Alternatively, this distinction may be more apparent in
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research which utilizes content domains which possess 
characteristics that make the knowledge constructs more 
distinguishable than they are for computers.
Based upon the discourse above, it is clear that my 
attempt at integrating the components of cognitive and 
social learning theory is not without its limitations. 
However, the strong effects for modeling as a means of 
acquiring procedural knowledge can not be discounted. In 
essence, this research has identified one possibility for 
why behavior modeling training is so effective. The 
methodology supports and encourages all those tenets of 
cognitive learning theory which are deemed necessary for 
the acquisition of procedural knowledge. Therefore, 
concerning modeling, the marriage between the theories 
does not appear to be a difficult one. The results from 
this study suggest that future examinations into how the 
integration between the two theories might be improved 
upon is certainly warranted.
Conclusions
In the broadest sense, the present research has 
attempted to shed some light on the processes involved in 
acquiring skills related to technology. Because research 
in the area of technology training and human-computer 
interaction is so sparse, the present study offers 
numerous avenues for further pursuit in the research 
realm. The paucity of research examining human reactions
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to computers (both affective and behavioral) has been 
noted before (Turnage, 1990). In a sense, this effort 
attempts to answer that call. Below I provide a brief 
summary of the answers obtained in my research.
The results from my research suggest that behavior 
modeling training is an excellent methodology for training 
individuals on how to use computers. Further, I 
determined that supplementing behavior modeling training 
with a lecture was notssary for trainee learning.
Lecture training was found to be an effective method using 
implicit measures of learning (performance and practice), 
but did not differentiate between groups on explicit 
knowledge tests (declarative and procedural). Further, I 
found some evidence for the convergent and discriminant 
validity of declarative and procedural knowledge. 
Concerning the latter (discriminant validity), the support 
was weak. I expect that the problem of discriminating 
between declarative and procedural knowledge lies in the 
heavy process-dependence the two constructs possess, 
particularly in the computer domain.
As a whole, the results revolving around the 
application of computer attitudes to computer training are 
also promising. Autonomous entity beliefs were 
significantly (and negatively) related to computer 
knowledge acquisition. Further, the training intervention 
was effective in decreasing autonomous entity beliefs.
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Beneficial tool attitudes were improved in conditions 
where trainees received a lecture on computers.
Autonomous entity beliefs, on the other hand, decreased 
when trainees did not receive a lecture.
The summary presented above suggests a profusion of 
avenues for future research. My examination of the 
relationship between cognitive and social learning theory 
can serve as a springboard for research that attempts to 
determine how well the two theories operate together. If 
the two theories are indeed compatible, then it appears 
that through two distinctly different research foci (macro 
and micro) we arrive at the conclusion that the 
fundamental tenets are in fact very similar. Still, 
further exploration is warranted into the viability of 
this cognitive-social learning theory marriage in other 
realms besides computers and technology. My concluding 
remarks turn to this realm and leave behind the 
theoretical discussions of learning.
The so-called computer age in which we now live has 
63 6Xup numerous doorways for human advancement. 
Unfortunately, our understanding of how to approach these 
doorways has fallen short. My research presents an 
attempt at exploring how individuals learn to use 
computers and how they feel about the machines. Whether 
we feel that computers are assuming control over our lives 
or are simply a useful instrument for the betterment of
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mankind, one thing is certain: computers and technology 
are here to stay.
With this in mind, we should attempt to explore those 
aspects that help us to understand this eminent presence. 
Through my exploration of how individuals learn to use 
technology, I have discovered that the most salient 
component is a need to observe how others behave when 
interacting with the machine. Perhaps this is the "high- 
touch" component in a 91 high-tech81 world which Naisbitt 
(1982) spoke of as so important to our needs as humans in 
the technology-laden world of the future. Hereafter, 
inquiries into the nature and consequences of 
technological advancement should continue to examine and 
develop these "high-touch" components in the hopes of 
improving the interaction between human and machine.
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Appendix A 
Outline for Key Learning Points Lecture
I. OVERVIEW
A. Description of the computer
B. Important keys on the keyboard
C. Internal and external drives
D. Introduction to DOS
II. FILES AND FILE STORAGE
A. Filing cabinet analogy
1. Drives like filing cabinets named A, B, or C
2. Directories like file folders in cabinets
B. Sample directory tree (filing cabinet)
1. Root Directory
2. Sub-directories
a. underneath the root directory
b. underneath other sub-directories
C. File folders have files in them
1. File naming
a. up to 8 letters & numbers plus option for 3 
more letters or numbers
2. Examples of filenames
D. The DOS Prompt
1. (drive letter):\(directory)\>
2. DOS syntax explained (command plus parameters)
III. WORKING IN DOS
A. The DOS Prompt - (drive letter):\(directory)\>
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B. Entering a command - type the command, use backspace 
to correct (if necessary), press <ENTER>
C. Format of commands - drive:\directory\filename.ext
1. Can omit drive/directory if in the one you want
2. Can omit filename.ext for entire directory
IV. SIMPLE DOS COMMANDS
A. CLS - clear screen
B. DATE
1. Finding out the date
2. Setting a new date
3. Examples
C. TIME
1. Finding out the time
2. Setting a new time
3. Examples
V. VIEWING FILES - The DIR and TYPE commands
A. Viewing the contents of directories (DIR)
1. Formats
a. DIR view all files in current directory
b. DIR drive:\directory
c. DIR drive:\directory\filename.ext
2. Information you get from DIR
a. filename and extension
b. size (in bytes)
c. creation date and time
d. bytes in directory and on entire drive
VI.
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3. Switches (the "/" means a switch is in use)
a. /P = do a directory one page at a time
b. /W = view only file names in a wide format
4. Global wildcard characters
a. * for all
(1) all files must be *.*
(2) *.x = all files with an "x" extension
(3) x.* = all "x" files with any extension
(4) x*.* = all files beginning with "x"




5. Use DIR as feedback for other commands






A. The RENAME (REN) Command
1. Formats
a. REN drive:\directory\oldname.ext newname.ext
b. REN oldname.ext newname.ext
2. Can't rename to a new directory
3. Can't rename to a file that already exists
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4. Much faster than copying the file to a new name
5. If in the directory where the file is and you 
want the newly named file in that directory, you can 
omit the drive and directory parts of the command




2. DEL and the wildcard characters
a. DEL *.XXX - all files ending in "XXX"
b. DEL MYPROG.* - all "MYPROG" files
c. DEL *.* - be careful, deletes all files
C. The COPY Command
1. Formats
a. COPY drive:\directory\source.ext drive: 
\directory\destiny.ext
b. COPY drive:\directory\source.ext drive:
c. COPY drive:\directory\source.ext drive: 
\directory
d. COPY source.ext drive:\directory\destiny.ext
e. COPY source.ext drive:\directory
2. You can overwrite the destination file
3. COPY and the wildcard characters
a. COPY C:\PROG\MYFILE.? C:\NEW\NEWFILE.?
b. COPY C:\PROG\MYDAT C:\DOS\MYDAT2
C. COPY C:\PROG\*.XXX C:\NEW
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d. COPY *.DAT C:\
e. COPY *.* C:\NEW
f. COPY TOM HARRY 
VII. REARRANGING DIRECTORIES
A. The CHDIR or CD command - changing directories
1. Formats
a. CD dirname - go down one directory level 
(will get an error if directory does not exist)
b. CD\dirname - go to a directory that has the 
same parent directory as the one you're in
c. CD\ - go to root directory
d. CD.. - go up one directory level
2. The concept of directory paths - moving around 
the directory tree
3. Examples of moving around the directory tree
B. The MKDIR or MD command - making a directory
1. Formats
a. MD dirname - make dir one level down
b. MD\dirname - make dir as specified
2. If a directory exists with the same name, you 
cannot make a new one
3. Makes a directory one level below the current 
directory
a. most computers have just the root directory 
and its sub-directories
b. can have many more levels (tree analogy)
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C. The RMDIR or RD command - removing a directory
1. Formats
a. RD directory - remove a directory one level 
below the current directory
b. RD\dirname - remove directory following the 
specified path
2. Directory removal procedure
a. remove all files from directory to be removed
b. remove all sub-directories from the directory 
to be removed (including any files in those 
directories)
c. execute the remove directory command
Appendix B 
Task List for Practice Session 
For the following, the current directory (blank for the 
root directory) and the correct answer are placed in 
brackets next to the task statement. Equifinality exists 
with respect to many of the commands. In these instances, 
the optimal answer is given (credit for a correct response 
in the practice was given only for optimal responding). 
Additionally, all task practice was performed on floppy 
disk drive A:. As such, no drive specifications are given 
or required.
Simple DOS Commands
The following commands center around the simple 
commands used in the DOS environment. They include 
clearing the screen, finding the date and time on the 
computer, and changing the date and time on the computer.
- Clear the screen. [, CLS]
- Identify the current date on the computer. [OLD, DATE]
- Change the time on the computer to 12:15 a.m. [, TIME 
1 2 :15]
- Change the date on the computer to May 3rd, 1992. [NEW,
DATE 5/3/92]
- Change the time on the computer to 2:31 p.m. [NEW, TIME 
14:31]




- Change the date on the computer to March 2nd, 1993. [, 
DATE 3/2/93]
- Change the date on the computer to October 31st, 1982. 
[FRED, DATE 10/31/82]
Viewing Files
The following set of commands are designed to provide 
you with practice on how to view the contents of 
directories on the computer and how to view the contents 
of individual files on the computer.
- List the files contained in the PROG directory. [PROG, 
DIR]
- Display the contents of the file MYDAT.TXT in the OLD 
directory. [OLD, TYPE MYDAT.TXT]
- Display the files in the PROG directory. [FRED,
DIR \PR0G]
- Display information on the file ME.TXT in the directory 
OLD. [NEW, DIR \OLD\ME.TXT]
- Display the contents of the file ME.TXT in the LETTERS 
directory. [NEW, TYPE \LETTERS\ME.TXT]
- List the files with a TXT extension in the OLD 
directory. [OLD, DIR *.TXT]
- Display all the files that start with the letters ME 
that are in the NEW directory. [, DIR \NEW\ME*.*]
- Display all the files in the root directory using the 
wide format. [OLD, DIR \ /W]
-• Display the contents of the file YOURDAT.TXT in the OLD 
directory. [FRED, TYPE \OLD\YOURDAT.TXT]
- Display the files in the OLD directory one page at a 
time. [LETTERS, DIR \OLD /P]
- List the files in the PROG directory that have the 
letter A in the third position of the extension. [NEW, DIR 
\PROG\*.??A]
- Using the wide format, list all files with a filename of 
MYDAT in the NEW directory. [NEW, DIR MYDAT.* /W]
- Display the contents of the file BILL.BAT in the root 
directory. [PROG, TYPE \BILL.BAT]
- Display all files in the NEW directory that have a TXT 
extension one page at a time. [OLD, DIR \NEW\*.TXT /P]
- List all files with a filename of JACK in the LETTERS 
directory. [PROG, DIR \LETTERS\JACK.*]
Rearranging Directories
The following commands instruct you on how to rearrange 
directories on the computer. This involves moving from 
one directory to another, creating directories, and 
removing directories.
- Create a first level directory called BOB. [, MD BOB]
- Remove the directory called BILL. [, RD BILL]
- Go to the directory called BOB. [BILL, CD \BOB]
- Go up one directory level. [DATE\ONE, CD ..]
- Create a second level directory called DAY underneath 
the first level directory called NIGHT. [, MD NIGHT\DAY]
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- Go to the OLD directory. [NEW, CD \OLD]
- Go to the directory DATA which is underneath the first
level directory called BOB. [BILL, CD \B0B\DATA]
- Remove the second level directory called FILES which is 
underneath the BOB directory. [DATA\TW0, RD \BOB\FILES]
- Go down one directory level to the TEXT directory.
[BILL, CD TEXT]
- Go to the root directory. [BILL\TEXT, CD \]
- Go to the directory FILES which is underneath the
directory OLD. [OLD, CD FILES]
Rearranging Files
The following practice revolves around teaching you how 
to use the commands needed to rearrange files on the 
computer. These commands allow you to rename files, 
delete files, and copy files.
- Give the file AAA.DAT the new name BBB.TXT. [BACK, REN 
AAA.DAT BBB.TXT]
- Rename the file BILL.l in the OLD directory to BOB.2. 
[NEW, REN \OLD\BILL.1 BOB.2]
- Copy the file MYFILE in the FRED directory to the file 
MY.OLD in the OLD directory. [FRED, COPY MYFILE 
\0LD\MY.OLD]
- Erase all files with the XXX extension in the OLD 
directory. [PROG, DEL \0LD\*.XXX]
- Delete all files in the BILL directory. [BILL, DEL *.*]
- Remove all files in the PROG directory that begin with 
the letter Q. [BILL, DEL \PROG\Q*.*]
- Remove the file MYPROG.XXX from the DATA directory. 
[DATA, DEL MYPROG.XXX]
- Delete all files in the LETTERS directory.
[DEL\LETTERS\*.*]
- Copy the file DATA.5 from the NEW directory to the OLD 
directory. [, COPY \NEW\DATA.5 \OLD]
- Copy all the files with a BAT extension from the root 
directory to the OLD directory. [NEW, COPY \*.BAT \OLD]
- Rename the file MIKE in the BBALL directory to JORDAN. 
[BILL, REN \BBALL\MIKE JORDAN]
- Copy all the files that start with the letters ME in the 
BACK directory to files that start with the letters YOU in 
the NEW directory. [BACK, COPY ME*.* \NEW\YOU*.*]
- Change the name of the file JONES (which is in the root 
directory) to the filename JOHNSON. [BACK, REN \JONES 
JOHNSON]
- Erase all files in the root directory that have an 
extension with the number 5 in the third position. [MIKE, 
DEL \*.??5]
- Copy all the files in the NEW directory to the OLD 
directory. [NEW, COPY *.* \OLD]
- Copy all files in the DATA directory that have a TEXT 
filename to the root directory. [DATA, COPY TEXT.* \]
Appendix C 
Sample Modeling Intervention Script 
To demonstrate the operation of the modeling 
intervention, I have provided a transcript from the 
modeling videotape. This particular excerpt was drawn 
from the "Simple DOS Commands" section which presented a 
model performing and describing the CLS, DATE, and TIME 
commands. The excerpt provides an introduction to what 
DOS looks like on the screen and then describes the CLS 
and DATE commands. Bracketed information in the text is 
provided to describe the actions being taken by the model 
during the discussion.
"I'd like to start off by describing some of the simple
commands you can use in DOS. Notice that we are on the A
drive, that's the A: you see on the screen and there's a 
backslash telling us what directory we're in. [model 
points to prompt with pencil] The letters OLD tell us 
we're in the OLD directory. The greater than sign (that's 
the prompt) follows and then the flashing cursor telling 
us that DOS is ready to accept our commands."
"The first command I'd like to tell you about is the
command to find out the date on the computer. To find out 
what the date is you simply type in date [model types DATE 
on keyboard], D-A-T-E and press enter [model presses 
enter]. Here you see on the computer that the current 
date is April 8th, 1980. [model points to date with
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pencil] After the date you see a prompt to change to a new 
date. At this point, simply press enter to ignore this 
[model presses enter] When you do this, the DOS prompt 
returns on the next line below the date prompt."
"Now suppose we wanted to change the date to May 1st, 
1993. To do that we would type the DATE command, a space, 
and the date you want to change to. This date is the 
parameter for the DATE command. In this case, we would 
type D-A-T-E [model types], space May, slash one for the 
first, slash ninety-three for the year, [model types in 
date]. Then press enter [model presses enter] and DOS 
will change its date to May 1st 1993. Notice that you get 
the DOS prompt back immediately. This tells you that you 
have not made an error, [model points to DOS prompt with 
pencil] If you want to check and make sure that the date 
is correct, all you need do is type DATE and press enter, 
[model types in date command and presses enter] Again we 
just press enter at the prompt asking if we want to change 
the date, [model presses enter] Notice that the new date 
is correct, [model points to new date with pencil]"
Appendix D 
Declarative Knowledge Test 
For the following questions, write the correct answer next 
to the question on the right hand side of the page.
1. What is "A:\>" called?
2. What command gives you the current date on the 
computer?
3. What is the command to clear the computer screen?
4. What command will tell me how many bytes are in a file?
5. What command allows you to view the contents of a
directory?
6. What command tells you how much disk space you have?
7. What command allows you to view the contents of a file?
8. To change the name of a file, what command would one 
use?
9. What is the command to remove a file from the computer?
10. What command allows one to duplicate a file's 
contents?
11. What command will over-write an already existent file?
12. If I wanted to go directly to the root directory, what
command would I use?
13. What is the command to create a directory?
14. What is the command to erase a directory?




16. If I want to move all files from one directory to 
another, what two commands must I know?
17. In general, what three commands are needed to prepare 
and execute the removal of a directory?
Appendix E 
Procedural Knowledge Test 
DIRECTIONS: For the following questions, be as specific as 
possible in describing how you would perform the tasks on 
the computer. NOTE: 1) what you would type, 2) when you 
would press enter, and 3) what you would look for once the 
command has been entered.
EXAMPLE: How would you find out what time it is according 
to the computer?
ANSWER: Type TIME and press (enter).
1. How would you set the computer's date to April 19th, 
1993?
2. How does one erase all the files in the NEW directory 
that have a BAT extension?
3. Describe the steps you would take to remove the OLD 
directory (assume that there are files in the OLD 
directory and that you are in that directory)?
4. How would you know for sure that the files you were to 
remove in question 2 have actually been removed?
5. Assuming that I am in the FRED directory, how would I 
change the names of all the files in this directory that 
start with the letter A to filenames that start with the 
letter B?
6. Describe the procedure for copying all of the files in 
the PROG directory to a new directory called FRED (assume 
FRED currently does not exist as a directory).
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7. What is the fastest way to change to the directory BILL 
if you are currently in the directory BOB (assume that 
both are under the root directory)?
8. Assume that the directory DATA contains the files: 
ONE.XY, TRI.XX, FOR.XY, SIX.XX, FIV.ZX, and TOO.XX. What 
is the fastest way to delete the files that have an XX 
extension?
9. Describe the procedure you would use to copy all files 
in the PROGS directory that have DB as the second and 
third letters of the extension to the root directory.
10. How would you obtain a wide format display of all 
files with a DAT extension in the directory BILLS which is 
underneath the directory COWBOYS?
11. Suppose you want to create the directory LETTERS under 
the directory EDIT which will be under the root directory 
assuming that neither of these directories exist, how 
would you execute this command?
12. Suppose you have a large amount of data in a file 
called TEXT and a 100 page research paper in a file called 
DATA. Assuming that both files are in the root directory 
and you are currently in the root directory, what is the 
fastest way to put the data in the DATA file and the text 
in the TEXT file?
13. You have all of your letters in a directory called 
DATA underneath another directory called TYPER. Your task 
is to place all your letters in a new directory under the
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TYPER directory called NEWLETS and remove the DATA 




a) For the following questions, your job is to execute the 
commands necessary to successfully perform the task on the 
computer.
b) You may need to perform intermediate steps to complete 
the task. For example, if a directory does not exist, you 
will have to create it.
c) Try to complete the tasks as quickly and accurately as 
possible using the fewest number of keystrokes possible.
d) DO ALL COMMANDS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY APPEAR 
BELOW!
1. Go to the root directory. Change the current date to 
April 19th, 1993 (NOTE: do this from the DOS prompt).
Once this is done, clear the screen, and change the date 
back to today's date.
2. Go to the PROG directory. List all the files in the 
PROG directory that have a TXT extension. From this list, 
rename any files that start with the letter O to filenames 
that start with the letter X.
3. Go to the root directory. Find out what the current
time is. Next, clear the screen. Finally, list all the
files in the root directory that have no extension.
4. Go to the OLD directory. Delete all the files in the
OLD directory and then remove the OLD directory.
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5. Go to the BACK directory. List the files in the BACK 
directory. Using this listing, erase any files with a 
date that is before December 1st, 1992.
6. Go to the BATCH directory. Display a list of the files 
in the BATCH directory that have a BAT extension. Using 
this listing, copy any files that have a size larger than 
100 bytes to the root directory.
7. Go to the FRED directory. Display a list of the sub­
directories underneath the FRED directory. For each of 
the directories underneath the FRED directory: a) Go to 
that sub-directory, and b) delete any files that have a 
BAB extension.
8. Go to the PROPLUS directory. Display a list of the 
sub-directories underneath the PROPLUS directory. One of 
these sub-directories has a text file (that you can read) 
called INFO.Q6 in it. Find this file, display its 
contents, and follow the instructions contained in the 
file.
9. Go to the NEW directory. Display a wide format listing 
of all the files in the NEW directory. Create two sub­
directories called ONE and FOUR underneath the NEW 
directory. Move (that is, don't leave an old copy behind) 
all the files with a 1 extension to the ONE sub-directory 
and all the files with a 4 extension to the FOUR sub­
directory. Finally, rename all the files with a 2 
extension to filenames with a 5 extension.
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10. Go to the root directory, clear the screen, and notify 
the experimenter that your are done!
Appendix G 
Beneficial Tool Attitude Scale 
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the questions below as 
accurately as possible by circling the appropriate 
response. Pay close attention to the answer key at the 
top of each page.
1 2 3 4 5
STRONGLY AM UNCERTAIN STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
 ____ 1. I would like to see all or part of my work done
by a computer.
  2. Computerizing part of my job/school would make me
more competitive in the job market.
_____  3. Using a computer at work/school would (has)
significantly increase(d) my satisfaction at work.
  4. Using a computer at work/school would (has)
significantly increase(d) my productivity.
  5. If I use(d) a computer, I can (could) save time
and work.
_____  6. Using a computer can (could) be enjoyable.
  7. I look forward to computers taking over certain
routine tasks of my home and job.




  9. The use of computers is enhancing our standard of
living.
  10. Life will be easier and faster with computers.
  11. Computers will help bring about a better way of
life for the average person.
Appendix H 
Autonomous Entity Attitude Scale 
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the questions below as 
accurately as possible by circling the appropriate 
response. Pay close attention to the answer key at the 
top of each page.
1 2 3 4 5
STRONGLY AM UNCERTAIN STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
_____  1. Computers intimidate and threaten me.
  2. Even though computers are valuable and necessary,
I still have a fear of them.
  3. Computers are being forced on us; we are having
our decision process replaced by them, making us lose 
control of our lives.
  4. Soon our lives will be controlled by computers.
_____  5. Computers are dehumanizing to society.
  6. Computers are lessening the importance of too
many jobs now done by people.
  7. Computers intimidate me because they seem so
complex.
  8. Someday in the future, these machines may be
running our lives.




  10. These machines help to create unemployment.




















Factor Loadings for Knowledge Items 
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test
DK DK PK PK
48 .56 .32 .14
,49 .41 .87 .70
,67 .54 .89 .62
63 .65 .61 .39
72 .44 .81 .73
70 .62 .92 .79
78 .67 .77 .67
67 .54 .72 .71
55 .47 .72 .77
58 .60 .76 .76
27 .38 .92 .75
75 .58 .43 .49







Drew Brock was an honor graduate of Paris High School 
in Paris, Texas. Upon his graduation in 1985, Drew 
attended the University of Texas at Austin. Studying 
psychology, he completed his Bachelor of Arts degree in 
1988. His senior thesis examined a theoretical 
integration of the constructs of locus of control, 
perceived control, and the Type A behavior pattern. In 
the fall of 1989, Drew entered the Industrial/ 
Organizational Psychology graduate program at Louisiana 
State University. He received his Master of Arts in Arts 
and Sciences from the University in 1991. Drew's research 
examined the relationships between computer use, computer 
attitudes, and work attitudes in a field study. The focus 
of his research during his graduate career has been on 
human-computer interaction and attitudes toward computers. 
He has presented two posters at conventions on this topic 
and has written a paper (in press) examining the construct 
validity of computer attitudes and the relationships of 
those attitudes to computer use. Currently, Drew works as 
a Human Resource Intern for a large hospital in Baton 
Rouge.
197
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: Drew Benjamin Brock
Major Field: Psychology
Title of Dissertation: Computer Training: The Role of Computer Attitudes
and Behavior Modeling in the Acquisition of 
Declarative and Procedural Knowledge
Approved:
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Date of Examination:
September 8, 1993
